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Patients’ Racial Preferences  
and the Medical Culture  
of Accommodation
Kimani Paul-Emile
AbstRACt
One of medicine’s open secrets is that patients routinely refuse or demand medical 
treatment based on the assigned physician’s racial identity, and hospitals typically yield to 
patients’ racial preferences.  This widely practiced, if rarely acknowledged, phenomenon—
about which there is new empirical evidence—poses a fundamental dilemma for law, 
medicine, and ethics.  It also raises difficult questions about how we should think about 
race, health, and individual autonomy in this context.  Informed consent rules and 
common law battery dictate that a competent patient has an almost-unqualified right 
to refuse medical care, including treatment provided by an unwanted physician.  Yet the 
accommodation of patients’ racial preferences with respect to their choice of physician 
in the hospital context appears to violate antidiscrimination principles.  How should 
we reconcile this apparent conflict between respect for patient autonomy and accepted 
notions of racial equality?  Moreover, is the accommodation of patients’ racial preferences 
the type of invidious discrimination that civil rights laws were enacted to prevent?
This Article engages these questions through an evaluation of antidiscrimination norms, 
principles of medical ethics, and federal laws, including Titles II, VI, and VII of the 
Civil Rights Act.  In so doing, the Article offers critical insights into why a form of 
discrimination that is prohibited in other contexts is tolerated in the hospital setting and 
draws important conclusions about the legal propriety and medical efficacy of this practice. 
The Article contends that the various titles of the Civil Rights Act offer no clear legal 
directive on this practice, and it makes the counterintuitive claim that although hospital 
accommodation of patients’ racial preferences appears to contravene antidiscrimination 
principles, it is not only consistent with our normative commitments to racial equality 
but, in fact, constitutes an effective means of alleviating race-based health disparities, 
improving health outcomes, and quite possibly, saving patients’ lives.
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INTRODUCTION 
In early November 1931, Juliette Derricotte, Dean of Women at Hampton 
and Fisk College and former executive of the national YWCA, sustained severe 
injuries during a car accident.  The closest hospital advertised “no Negroes,” so an 
ambulance was summoned from sixty-six miles away to take her to a hospital that 
treated black patients.  She died of her injuries before she could receive treat-
ment.1  Similarly, in 1940, John McBride was denied admission at two local south 
Florida hospitals after suffering a bullet wound.2  The only two hospitals in the area 
that accepted black patients were miles away in Miami and West Palm Beach; thus 
McBride died without hospital care. 
These tragic accounts are stark reminders of a history that many Americans 
believe is long past.  Yet, race discrimination in the provision of healthcare is not a 
relic of the Jim Crow era.  Discrimination still occurs quite frequently, and healthcare 
providers actively and routinely facilitate it.  This modern-day race discrimination 
assumes a form distinct from the type that led to the deaths of Juliette Derricotte, 
John McBride, and countless others, and it is in many ways more complex, nu-
anced, and perplexing.  When we think of race discrimination in healthcare today, 
we tend to think about race-based health disparities and bias exhibited by physi-
cians or other providers, but new studies illuminate a different kind of race discrim-
ination in the hospital setting.  Today, rather than turning patients away based on 
race, healthcare providers are instead facilitating patients’ racial biases by enabling 
them to turn physicians away based on race.  In other words, healthcare providers 
accommodate patients’ racial preferences.3 
Consider two examples: An older patient of Korean ancestry enters the hos-
pital in very poor health with a condition that is difficult both to diagnose and to 
  
1. See W. MICHAEL BYRD & LINDA A. CLAYTON, AN AMERICAN HEALTH DILEMMA: RACE, 
MEDICINE AND HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED STATES 1900–2000, at 181 (2002). 
2. See DAVID BARTON SMITH, HEALTH CARE DIVIDED: RACE AND HEALING A NATION 19 
(1999). 
3. See generally Aasim I. Padela et al., Patient Choice of Provider Type in the Emergency Department: 
Perceptions and Factors Relating to Accommodation of Requests for Care Providers, 27 EMERGENCY 
MED. J. 465 (2010); Emilia Benton, Should EPs Accommodate Patient Requests for a Specific Doctor? 
Many Do, EMERGENCY MED. NEWS, Apr. 2011, at 22, available at http://journals.lww.com/em-
news/Fulltext/2011/04000/Breaking_News__Should_EPs_Accommodate_Patient.3.aspx; Vida 
Foubister, Requests by Patients Can Put Doctors in Ethical Bind, AM. MED. NEWS (Jan. 22, 2001), 
http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2001/01/22/prsb0122.htm; Kenneth Kipnis, Quality Care and 
the Wounds of Diversity, 97 APA NEWSLS. 112, 112–13 (1998); Women, Minorities More Likely to See 
Doctor of Choice in Emergency Room, U. MICH. HEALTH SYS. (July 22, 2010), http://www2.med. 
umich.edu/prmc/media/newsroom/details.cfm?ID=1664. 
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treat.  He is offered a treatment regimen that promises a better than 50 percent 
chance of recovery with minimal risks, yet he nevertheless refuses further medical 
intervention.  The hospital thus stops all treatment and the patient would likely 
have died had a member of the hospital medical staff not noticed that the patient 
had also requested full cardiopulmonary support should he go into arrest.  When 
confronted with this seeming contradiction, the patient confesses that he does not 
want to be treated by the assigned physicians, who were of Japanese descent.  The 
physicians accede to the patient’s wishes, he accepts treatment, and he makes a full 
recovery.4   
A patient with a potentially life-threatening cardiovascular disorder is taken 
to the hospital for surgery.  Prior to the procedure, the patient’s husband demands 
that the hospital prohibit black men from entering the operating room during the 
surgery.  The surgeon accommodates the patient’s request and later explains that 
he did so because he did not believe that the patient would have otherwise gone 
through with the surgery.5  Both examples are real-life accounts of healthcare pro-
viders yielding to patients’ racially biased demands.  Such requests by patients are 
not only quite common but also are often accommodated quietly.6 
A recent study shows that some patients refuse or demand treatment based 
on the racial identity of the assigned healthcare provider and that providers are 
likely to accede to these patients’ preferences.7  Research also reveals that patients 
of all races make race-based choices about who may treat them in hospitals.  Many 
healthcare providers accommodate these requests in circumstances in which the 
patient has no option for care other than a hospital outpatient department and in 
situations in which a patient is in need of emergency services.8  Indeed, according 
to Herbert Rakatansky, MD, former Chair of the American Medical Association’s 
(AMA) Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, “In a life-threatening situation, 
you would have to abide by the patient’s request.”9 
The culture of accommodation in the hospital setting has created a clash of 
competing medical ethics and legal norms: evidence-based and patient-centered 
approaches to medical care versus accepted notions of racial equality and antidis-
  
4. Kipnis, supra note 3, at 112–13. 
5. Foubister, supra note 3. 
6. See Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 612 F.3d 908, 912 (7th Cir. 2010) (addressing patient pre-
ference discrimination in long-term healthcare facilities); Foubister, supra note 3; Women, Minorities 
More Likely to See Doctor of Choice in Emergency Room, supra note 3. 
7. Padela et al., supra note 3, at 465; see also Foubister, supra note 3. 
8. This observation is based on data obtained through author interviews with physicians from September 
2011 through July 2012. 
9. Foubister, supra note 3. 
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crimination principles.10  Medical ethics, for example, embraces patient-oriented 
strategies for the provision of care, including the dictates of the Hippocratic Oath, 
as well as informed-consent rules and common law battery, which make clear that 
competent patients have a right to refuse unwanted medical treatment.11  Yet, 
while the AMA’s Code of Medical Ethics maintains that physicians “may not de-
cline to accept patients because of race, color, religion, national origin, sexual ori-
entation, gender identity, or any other basis that would constitute invidious dis-
crimination,” the medical profession does not have a specific policy regarding 
healthcare institutions accommodating patients’ racially biased requests.12 
Likewise, the law offers little guidance on how to address this practice.  Al-
though several titles of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (CRA) speak to similar types of 
discrimination—including Title VII, which prohibits employers from catering to 
the racially biased requests of their clientele—they do not offer a clear legal di-
rective on the issue of hospitals acceding to the racial preferences of their patients.13  
The only case that comes close to approaching this issue is Chaney v. Plainfield 
Healthcare Center,14 in which the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Title 
VII bars nursing homes from acceding to their residents’ racially discriminatory 
requests with respect to certified nursing assistants.  But, for reasons explained in 
Part III, this case does not meaningfully attend to the matter of hospitals facil-
itating patients’ racial preferences regarding their choice of physician. 
This widespread phenomenon raises difficult questions about how we should 
think about race, health, and individual autonomy in this context.  Should we, for 
example, think the same way about all the types of preferences expressed?  Does 
the fact that some racial preferences evoke the types of discrimination long out-
lawed by civil rights statutes render patient racial accommodations problematic?  
Are there reasons to treat the different examples differently?  Questions such as 
these pose a fundamental dilemma for law, medicine, and ethics.  This Article is 
the first to address these questions and bring into the legal literature an examina-
tion of the medical practice of race-based patient accommodation. 
  
10. Women, Minorities More Likely to See Doctor of Choice in Emergency Room, supra note 3. 
11. See infra Part II. 
12. See AMA Code of Medical Ethics, Opinion 9.12—Physician–Patient Relationship: Respect for 
Law and Human Rights (2008), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/ 
medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion912.page. 
13. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a, 2000e (2006).  The various titles of the CRA 
proscribe unequal application of voter registration requirements and racial segregation in education, 
employment, and public accommodations.  See id. 
14. 612 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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At first blush, antidiscrimination law and general racial-equality principles 
would seem to bar hospitals from accommodating patients’ racial preferences de-
spite the quiet persistence of this practice.  This Article makes the counterintu-
itive claim, however, that the law does and should permit this practice, and that 
accommodating patients’ racial preferences actually advances racial equality.  It 
demonstrates that there are, in fact, many good reasons to allow hospitals to ac-
commodate patients’ racial preferences.  Recent empirical data on physician–patient 
race concordance (the ability of a patient to be treated by a healthcare practitioner 
of the same racial background, ethnic background, or both) show that permitting 
hospitals to accede to their patients’ racial preferences may not only alleviate race-
based health disparities but also constitute a life-saving measure for many racial-
minority patients.15  I contend, therefore, that in the absence of countervailing law 
or of evidence that accommodating expressions of racial preferences would com-
promise care, and in light of the significant health benefits conferred by this prac-
tice, the accommodation of patients’ racial preferences with respect to their choice 
of physician should be preserved in the hospital setting. 
Legal scholars have long debated ways to deal with race in several contexts, 
particularly in the realms of criminal justice,16 housing,17 and edu-
  
15. See infra Part IV. 
16. See generally BENJAMIN BOWLING & CORETTA PHILLIPS, RACISM, CRIME AND JUSTICE (2002); 
DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY IN AN AGE OF 
ABOLITION (2010); RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997); RACE, 
ETHNICITY, SEXUAL ORIENTATION, VIOLENT CRIME: THE REALITIES AND THE MYTHS 
(Nathaniel J. Pallone ed., 2000); SAMUEL WALKER ET AL., THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACE, 
ETHNICITY, AND CRIME IN AMERICA (2d ed. 2000); Angela J. Davis, Benign Neglect of Racism in the 
Criminal Justice System, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1660 (1996); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and 
the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1016 (1988); Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, 
and the Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775 (1999). 
17. See generally Michelle Adams, Is Integration a Discriminatory Purpose?, 96 IOWA L. REV. 837 (2011) 
(discussing recent Supreme Court doctrine that may prohibit governments from racially integrating 
different sectors, including the housing sector, unless they do so through facially neutral programs); 
Margalynne Armstrong, Protecting Privilege: Race, Residence and Rodney King, 12 LAW & INEQ. 
351 (1994) (arguing that racial and economic residential segregation inhibit the social mobility of 
the poor); Isaac N. Groner & David M. Helfeld, Race Discrimination in Housing, 57 YALE L.J. 426 
(1948) (discussing racial segregation in housing patterns by public and private authorities); Rigel C. 
Oliveri, Is Acquisition Everything? Protecting the Rights of Occupants Under the Fair Housing Act, 43 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2008) (discussing a recent trend of courts interpreting the Fair Housing 
Act not to protect occupants from discrimination after they have moved into their homes); Florence 
Wagman Roisman, Intentional Racial Discrimination and Segregation by the Federal Government as a 
Principal Cause of Concentrated Poverty: A Response to Schill and Wachter, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1351 
(1995) (discussing racial discrimination and segregation by federal housing programs); Adam Weiss, 
Grutter, Community, and Democracy: The Case for Race-Conscious Remedies in Residential Segregation 
Suits, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1195 (2007) (arguing that the Equal Protection Clause allows judges to 
set remedial goals for residential integration that take account of individuals’ races). 
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cation.18  Relatively little attention, however, has been paid to the ways in which 
race is deployed in healthcare.  This is particularly worrisome because issues of race 
can affect both patient care and health outcomes.  And to the extent that these 
issues are considered, the focus has been on race-based health disparities and on 
bias by physicians and other healthcare providers.19  Yet there has been no analy-
sis in the legal literature of the propriety of healthcare institutions acceding to indi-
vidual patients’ racial prejudices.  
Scholars in other fields, primarily medicine and public health, have attempted 
to examine this phenomenon empirically by assessing its prevalence,20 the contexts 
  
18. See generally Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don’t Tell, Don’t Ask: Narrow Tailoring After Grutter and 
Gratz, 85 TEX. L. REV. 517 (2007); Kevin Brown & Jeannine Bell, Demise of the Talented Tenth: 
Affirmative Action and the Increasing Underrepresentation of Ascendant Blacks at Selective Higher 
Educational Institutions, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1229 (2008); Harry T. Edwards, The Journey From Brown 
v. Board of Education to Grutter v. Bollinger: From Racial Assimilation to Diversity, 102 MICH. L. 
REV. 944 (2004); Rachel F. Moran, Diversity and Its Discontents: The End of Affirmative Action at 
Boalt Hall, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2241 (2000); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Admission of Legacy 
Blacks, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1141 (2007). 
19. See Dayna Bowen Matthew, A New Strategy to Combat Racial Inequality in American Health Care 
Delivery, 9 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 793, 796, 798–821 (2005) (discussing how, despite its suc-
cess in desegregating hospitals, Title VI has largely been ineffective in preventing race-based discrim-
ination with respect to quality of care); Brietta R. Clark, Hospital Flight From Minority Communities: 
How Our Existing Civil Rights Framework Fosters Racial Inequality in Healthcare, 9 DEPAUL J. 
HEALTH CARE L. 1023, 1028–44, 1056–88 (2005) (discussing how hospital closures in poor 
minority communities demonstrate persistent racial discrimination in healthcare and how the cur-
rent legal structure has not prevented such discrimination); Lisa C. Ikemoto, In the Shadow of Race: 
Women of Color in Health Disparities Policy, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1023, 1046–52 (2006) (discuss-
ing how the current analysis of racial disparities in healthcare fails to take into account gender dis-
parities as well, thus continuing a pattern of discrimination against women of color); Kevin Outterson, 
The End of Reparations Talk: Reparations in an Obama World, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 935, 946–48 
(2009) (discussing how President Obama’s focus on health reform, and not on reparations, might be 
successful in reducing racial disparities in access to healthcare); Vernellia R. Randall, Eliminating 
Racial Discrimination in Health Care: A Call for State Health Care Anti-discrimination Law, 10 
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1, 8–24 (2006) (discussing how Title VI has not prevented racial dis-
crimination because the Supreme Court has ruled that it only prohibits intentional discrimination); 
Ruqaiijah Yearby, Does Twenty-Five Years Make a Difference in “Unequal Treatment”?: The Persistence 
of Racial Disparities in Health Care Then and Now, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 57, 57 (2010) (discussing 
how current federal programs aimed at eliminating racial discrimination in healthcare have been 
unsuccessful and calling “scholars, researchers, and federal officials to adopt a new approach to eradi-
cate racial disparities”). 
20. See generally Lisa A. Cooper et al., Patient-Centered Communication, Ratings of Care, and Concordance 
of Patient and Physician Race, 139 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 907 (2003); Thomas A. LaVeist et 
al., The Association of Doctor–Patient Race Concordance With Health Services Utilization, 24 J. PUB. 
HEALTH POL’Y 312 (2003); Jennifer Malat & Mary Ann Hamilton, Preference for Same-Race Health 
Care Providers and Perceptions of Interpersonal Discrimination in Health Care, 47 J. HEALTH & SOC. 
BEHAV. 173 (2006); Irena Stepanikova et al., Patients’ Race, Ethnicity, Language, and Trust in a 
Physician, 47 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 390 (2006); Damon Adams, Patients Say Best Doctors Are 
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in which these preferences are exercised,21 and the connection between patients’ 
preferences and both healthcare utilization and health outcomes.22  These scholars 
have tended to base their analyses in autonomy and informed consent, but this lit-
erature has not endeavored to address antidiscrimination law and norms. 
This Article, therefore, attempts to advance our understanding of this phe-
nomenon by evaluating federal laws, antidiscrimination norms, evidence-based 
medical practices, and medical ethics principles in order to draw important conclu-
sions about the phenomenon’s legal propriety and medical efficacy.  In so doing, 
the Article offers critical insights into why a form of discrimination that is rightly 
prohibited in other contexts should be tolerated in the hospital setting. 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows.  Part I investigates the hos-
pital practice of bowing to patients’ race-based requests and the motivation behind 
physicians’ willingness to do so.  To this end, Part I examines the first major em-
pirical study to address how physicians respond when they are asked to make com-
promises to meet patients’ racial preferences.  
Part II maps the prevailing medical ethics principles and legal doctrines that 
operate as default rules governing a patient’s right to refuse unwanted medical 
treatment, including the doctrines of informed consent and common law battery.  
This Part also addresses the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act 
(EMTALA),23 which requires hospitals to provide a medical screening examina-
tion and medical treatment, if necessary, to any individual who comes to a hospital 
  
Ones Who Look Like Them, AMEDNEWS.COM (Jan. 12, 2004), http://www.ama-assn.org/amed 
news/2004/01/12/prse0112.htm. 
21. See generally Padela et al., supra note 3 (analyzing how doctors respond to patients’ preferences for 
emergency medical providers of similar backgrounds); Frederick M. Chen et al., Patients’ Beliefs About 
Racism, Preferences for Physician Race, and Satisfaction With Care, 3 ANNALS FAM. MED. 138 (2005) 
(analyzing surveys showing that minorities who perceive racism in the healthcare system are more 
likely to prefer physicians of the same race); Somnath Saha et al., Do Patients Choose Physicians of 
Their Own Race?, 19 HEALTH AFF. 76 (2000) (arguing that minority patients’ preferences for phy-
sicians of their own race should encourage medical schools to reassess their admissions policies to 
increase the supply of minority physicians). 
22. See generally UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN 
HEALTH CARE (Brian D. Smedley et al. eds., 2003) (analyzing why racial and ethnic minorities tend 
to receive healthcare of a lower quality); Chen et al., supra note 21; Adil H. Haider et al., Association 
of Unconscious Race and Social Class Bias With Vignette-Based Clinical Assessments by Medical Students, 
306 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 942 (2011) (analyzing unconscious race and social-class bias among medical 
students); Thomas A. LaVeist & Amani Nuru-Jeter, Is Doctor–Patient Race Concordance Associated 
With Greater Satisfaction With Care?, 43 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 296 (2002); Salimah H. 
Meghani et al., Patient–Provider Race-Concordance: Does It Matter in Improving Minority Patients’ 
Health Outcomes?, 14 ETHNICITY & HEALTH 107 (2009). 
23. Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 9121(b), 100 Stat. 82, 164–67 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395dd (2006)). 
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emergency department requesting treatment for an emergency medical condi-
tion.24  Part II, thus, lays the groundwork in medical ethics for considering the le-
gality and propriety of allowing healthcare providers to submit to a patient’s re-
quest for or refusal of treatment by a physician of a particular race. 
Part III addresses the antidiscrimination laws that may speak to the accom-
modation of patients’ racial preferences, including Title II, which prohibits com-
mercial entities from catering to the racially biased requests of customers; Title 
VI, which prohibits race discrimination by any entity receiving federal funds; and 
Title VII, which precludes employers from acceding to the discriminatory prefer-
ences of their clientele.25  This Part demonstrates, first, that there is no clear legal 
directive on the issue of hospitals accommodating patients’ racial preferences.  Se-
cond, building on an analysis of recent empirical data on physician–patient race 
concordance and medical best practices, Part III argues that this practice does not 
constitute the type of discrimination that these laws were enacted to address.  In 
so doing, this Part demonstrates the ways in which bowing to patients’ racial prefer-
ences actually constitutes an effective means of improving minority health outcomes, 
alleviating health disparities among racial groups, and addressing racial subordina-
tion in the physician–patient relationship. 
The practice of hospitals accommodating patients’ racial preferences, howev-
er, is not without its troubling aspects.  Therefore, although Part IV argues that 
patients’ race-based requests should be respected in the hospital context, it also 
acknowledges the difficulties attendant to indulging such requests, and it con-
cludes by proposing policy solutions designed to alleviate the need to yield to pa-
tients’ racial preferences over the long term.26 
I. PHYSICIANS AND THE ACCOMMODATION 
OF PATIENTS’ PREFERENCES 
In 2010, researchers at the University of Michigan Health System and col-
leagues at the University of Pennsylvania and the University of Rochester pub-
lished an unprecedented study that received considerable attention within medical 
circles because it revealed one of medicine’s open secrets: how physicians respond 
  
24. See Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a). 
25. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a, 2000d, 2000e.   
26. Although in the hospital context physicians also often accommodate patients’ religious and gender 
preferences with respect to their choice of physicians, this Article focuses on the accommodation of 
patients’ racial preferences. 
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to patient requests for providers of the same gender, race, or religion.27  This first 
empirical study of the “culture of accommodation” in the hospital setting involved 
a survey of 127 emergency physicians from around the United States, and its re-
sults were unequivocal.28 
According to the study, patients often request a physician of a race, gender, 
or religion different from the one assigned, and such demands are accommodated 
routinely.29  Such requests are most frequently granted when the patient is a wom-
an, a racial minority, or a Muslim; and black, Hispanic, and Asian patients tend to 
believe that they receive better care from doctors of the same race.30  Female physi-
cians are more likely to accede to reassignment requests,31 and research shows that 
doctors at large and academically affiliated hospitals are more likely to accommo-
date these requests than those at community facilities.32  Doctors have expressed 
that they feel a particular need to acquiesce to these requests in urgent situations 
and in circumstances in which a patient has few, if any, alternate venues for care 
other than the hospital setting.33  The findings of the University of Michigan study 
and other documented accounts of healthcare providers accommodating patients’ 
racial preferences support the author’s own interviews with scores of physicians 
working in hospitals throughout the United States.  This, coupled with the fact 
that demand for hospital emergency services has risen steadily since 1996, sug-
gests that the accommodation of patients’ racial biases may be a widespread phe-
nomenon.34 
Although physicians are frequently called on to decide whether to accom-
modate patients’ preferences, hospitals lack policies to address this practice.  Ac-
cording to Rick Wade, former senior vice president of the American Hospital 
Association, “Hospitals do a lot of things every day to meet the special require-
ments of patients.  They do that as long as it does not compromise the hospital’s 
ability to deliver good medical care and does not interfere with the operation of the 
institution. . . . Every patient has the choice of the physician who is in control of 
  
27. Padela et al., supra note 3; see also Benton, supra note 3; Foubister, supra note 3; Women, Minorities 
More Likely to See Doctor of Choice in Emergency Room, supra note 3. 
28. Padela et al., supra note 3, at 468. 
29. Women, Minorities More Likely to See Doctor of Choice in Emergency Room, supra note 3. 
30. Padela et al., supra note 3, at 467–68. 
31. See id. at 466. 
32. Id. at 467 tbl.3. 
33. Foubister, supra note 3.  Given that, in nonemergency situations, patients may perform ex ante re-
search to choose a physician who fits their desired characteristics, it likely follows that patient requests 
for race-concordant physicians will occur most often in the emergency setting. 
34. See Eryn Brown, CDC: Emergency Room Visits Surged in 2009, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2011, http:// 
articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/18/news/la-heb-emergency-room-visits-up-20111018. 
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their care, and it’s up to that physician and the hospital then to assemble the team 
to do the job.”35 
Although patients have long enjoyed the freedom to select personal physi-
cians, and have been able to base their decisions on the physician’s race, gender, 
or ethnicity, in the hospital setting this practice raises unique concerns.  Here, the 
danger does not lie in the patient’s own sense of the relevance of race, nor is it 
simply a matter of the patient exercising private preferences.  Rather, the concern 
is that by bringing their preferences into the hospital setting and demanding ac-
commodations, these patients are confronting healthcare providers with a difficult 
conflict between their professional obligation to provide nondiscriminatory care 
and their ethical obligations to respect patients’ decisionmaking autonomy and to 
advance patients’ medical best interests. 
In the following Parts, this Article charts a course for how we should think 
about the practice of accommodating patients’ racial preferences both as a legal and 
as an ethical matter, beginning with a discussion of the significance of EMTALA, 
informed consent, and battery. 
II. THE DEFAULT RULES: INFORMED CONSENT, COMMON LAW 
BATTERY, AND EMTALA 
Physicians operate in accordance with a code of medical ethics that empha-
sizes the interests of patients and the obligations of physicians.  The basic principles 
that form the core of this code are nonmaleficence, respect for persons, beneficence, 
and justice.36  The concept of nonmaleficence, derived from the Hippocratic Oath, 
reminds physicians to do no harm.37  Respect for persons is an understanding that 
patients must be empowered to make informed and autonomous healthcare deci-
sions.38  Beneficence is the notion that healthcare providers’ primary obligation is to 
confer benefits while balancing the risks attendant to the provision of healthcare.39  
Justice refers to the fair distribution of scarce resources and respect for individual 
rights.40  These obligations form the normative backdrop for a physicians’ duty to 
  
35. Foubister, supra note 3 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
36. See generally TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 
(5th ed. 2001); NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND 
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES 
FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 
(1979), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/belmont.html. 
37. See TERRY M. PERLIN, CLINICAL MEDICAL ETHICS: CASES IN PRACTICE 11 (1992). 
38. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 36, at 57–112. 
39. Raanan Gillon, Medical Ethics: Four Principles Plus Attention to Scope, 309 BMJ 184, 184–85 (1994). 
40. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 36, at 226–27. 
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provide care, and they undergird the prevailing legal doctrines that govern the ac-
commodation of patients’ racial preferences in the hospital setting: informed 
consent, battery, and EMTALA. 
Informed consent, which emerged from the law of battery, is the doctrinal 
antecedent of the right to refuse unwanted medical care.  Indeed, the right of 
informed consent assumes a corollary right of informed refusal.  Thus, a compe-
tent patient has a common law and constitutionally protected liberty interest in 
refusing unwanted medical care.41  EMTALA, the federal anti-patient-dumping 
statute, requires hospitals to provide a medical screening examination to any indi-
vidual who arrives in a hospital emergency department requesting medical treat-
ment.42 
This Part illustrates how these laws and legal doctrines operate as guidelines 
that inform the way physicians and hospitals currently respond to a patient’s de-
mand for or refusal of treatment by a physician of a particular race.  It begins by 
examining the advent of the doctrine of informed consent, its roots in the law of 
battery, and the subsequent formulation of the right to refuse unwanted care.  It 
then sets forth the aims and concerns that prompted the U.S. Congress to enact 
EMTALA and the ways in which this law shapes decisionmaking in the hospital 
context with respect to accommodating patients’ racial preferences. 
A. Informed Consent 
The doctrine of informed consent, which is based on the notion of individual 
autonomy, has guided virtually all modern physician–patient interactions concern-
ing treatment decisions and has paved the way for the formulation of new patient-
centered approaches to medicine.43  The doctrine evolved as a means of addressing 
  
41. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990) (holding that a competent pa-
tient has a Fourteenth Amendment due process liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treat-
ment, including life sustaining treatment, and upholding the use of the clear and convincing evidence 
standard in determining the patient’s wishes with respect to medical treatment). 
42. See Gatewood v. Wash. Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (explaining that 
hospitals “patient dump[]” when “emergency rooms deny uninsured patients the same treatment pro-
vided paying patients,” and observing that “[r]eports of patient dumping rose in the 1980s, as hos-
pitals, generally unencumbered by any state law duty to treat, faced new cost containment pressures 
combined with growing numbers of uninsured and underinsured patients”). 
43. See Christine Laine & Frank Davidoff, Patient-Centered Medicine: A Professional Evolution, 275 J. 
AM. MED. ASS’N 152, 152–53 (discussing the “striking” shift in physician attitude toward patient 
awareness and participation in medical decisionmaking). 
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abuses and the fundamental knowledge differential between physician and pa-
tient that underlies the inequalities inherent in the treatment relationship.44 
Until the middle of the twentieth century, the treatment received by patients 
in hospitals was far from ideal.  According to George Annas, the hospital was “a 
human rights wasteland,” where the care of patients ranged from benign paternal-
ism to medical experimentation without consent or the possibility of therapeutic 
benefit.45  During this period, medical professionals operated under the assump-
tion that medicine was primarily a scientific endeavor, and that physicians—
because of their knowledge, experience, and expertise—were uniquely positioned 
to make decisions regarding their patients’ best interests.46  According to this ethos, 
patients had neither the interest nor the ability to participate in medical deci-
sionmaking.47  Thus, physicians routinely refused to counsel patients about im-
portant medical treatment options,48 did not inform patients of their prognosis, 
particularly when the chance of survival was low,49 ignored patients’ refusal of life-
sustaining treatment, and failed to consult patients when exams, tests, or proce-
dures were conducted primarily or solely to educate medical students.50 
These abuses were particularly pronounced for African American patients, 
who, until the 1960s, received health services primarily at large public hospitals, 
which were the training grounds for inexperienced medical students, interns, and 
residents.51  People of color and members of disadvantaged or vulnerable groups 
were also often used as training material.52  One particularly infamous example is 
the Tuskegee syphilis study, in which nearly four hundred African American men 
with syphilis were systematically denied known, effective medical remedies and 
  
44. See JANET L. DOLGIN & LOIS L. SHEPHERD, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW 57 (2d ed. 2009); 
MARK A. HALL ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 197 (7th ed. 2007). 
45. See GEORGE J. ANNAS, JUDGING MEDICINE 4–26 (1988).  The two early and foundational ac-
counts of dangerous human experimentation conducted without consent are Henry K. Beecher, 
Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1354 (1966), and M.H. PAPPWORTH, 
HUMAN GUINEA PIGS: EXPERIMENTATION ON MAN (1967). 
46. See Marc A. Rodwin, Patient Accountability and Quality of Care: Lessons From Medical Consumerism 
and the Patients’ Rights, Women’s Health and Disability Rights Movements, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 147, 
150 (1994). 
47. Id. at 150–51. 
48. Id. at 151. 
49. See generally Naoko T. Miyaji, The Power of Compassion: Truth-Telling Among American Doctors in the 
Care of Dying Patients, 36 SOC. SCI. & MED. 249 (1993). 
50. Rodwin, supra note 46, at 151. 
51. See SMITH, supra note 2, at 27.  This was so because of a symbiotic relationship between medical 
schools, teaching hospitals, and state and local financing for the indigent.  See id. 
52. See BYRD & CLAYTON, supra note 1, at 206 (“[B]lack, public aid populations became ‘training 
material’ for the medical school and research infrastructure . . . .”). 
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were not informed that they were treated for research, rather than diagnostic, pur-
poses.53  Sustained from 1932 to 1972, the Tuskegee study was the longest ex-
periment in withholding treatment from human subjects in medical history.54  
Ultimately, this and several other shocking examples of physician paternalism and 
deceit55 led to the emergence in the late 1960s and early 1970s of the patients’ 
rights movement and the advent of the modern doctrine of informed consent, which 
has empowered patients and changed the attitude of a new generation of physicians 
toward their patients.56  
Today, physicians are required to obtain a patient’s informed approval prior 
to performing treatment and must disclose information about the risks of the pro-
posed treatment, the alternatives, and the risks of the alternatives.  This mandatory 
information transfer from physician to patient not only safeguards the patient’s in-
terests and autonomy but also protects the patient’s essential status as a human 
being, prevents fraud and duress, encourages healthcare providers to consider their 
decisions carefully, and fosters rational decisionmaking by the patient.57  By 
  
53. See JESSICA W. BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL 
PRACTICE 255 (2d ed. 2001).  The Tuskegee syphilis study continued well after penicillin became 
available to treat the disease.  Id.  For more information about the study, see FRED D. GRAY, THE 
TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY: THE REAL STORY AND BEYOND (1998); JAMES H. JONES, BAD 
BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT (1981); William J. Curran, The Tuskegee Syphilis 
Study, 289 NEW ENG. J. MED. 730 (1973); and Robert M. White, Unraveling the Tuskegee 
Study of Untreated Syphilis, 160 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 585 (2000). 
54. See SMITH, supra note 2, at 25. 
55. In one high-profile case, a patient successfully sued her physician, who, after informing her that he 
intended only to mend a few cervical and rectal tears, instead removed entirely her ovaries and uterus.  
See Pratt v. Davis, 79 N.E. 562, 563–64 (Ill. 1906).  In another case, a surgeon extracted a patient’s 
fibroid tumor despite the fact that she had explicitly refused surgery and had agreed only to an exami-
nation under ether.  Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).  In yet another 
case, a surgeon, when asked about the risks of proposed hand surgery, reassured the patient that there 
was “nothing to it,” and then conducted surgery that left the patient’s hand permanently paralyzed.  
Hunt v. Bradshaw, 88 S.E.2d 762 (N.C. 1955). 
56. See Alan Meisel, Managed Care, Autonomy, and Decisionmaking at the End of Life, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 
1393, 1398–1400 (describing the advent of informed consent as coinciding with the rise of “citizen 
autonomy” movements in the 1960s, including the civil rights, students’ rights, children’s rights, 
spousal rights, and elder rights movements); see also GEORGE J. ANNAS, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES 
UNION, THE RIGHTS OF PATIENTS 1–16 (2d ed. 1992) (explaining the patient rights movement); 
Mark A. Hall, The Legal and Historical Foundations of Patients as Medical Consumers, 96 GEO. L.J. 
583, 586 (2008); Carol B. Liebman, Medical Malpractice Mediation: Benefits Gained, Opportunities 
Lost, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 149 (2011); Benjamin Moulton & Jaime S. King, 
Aligning Ethics With Medical Decision-Making: The Quest for Informed Patient Choice, 38 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 85, 86 (2010); Wendy E. Parmet, Unprepared: Why Health Law Fails to Prepare Us for a 
Pandemic, 2 J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 157, 167 (2006). 
57. Alexander Morgan Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment, 123 
U. PA. L. REV. 340, 364–76 (1974). 
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rendering the physician–patient relationship less hierarchical and more dialogic, 
the informed consent mandate enables healthcare providers to perform with 
increased sensitivity to a patient’s emotional needs, cognitive ability, and actual 
comprehension. 
B. Common Law Battery 
The theoretical underpinnings of the informed consent doctrine emerged 
from the law of battery, which safeguards a patient’s physical integrity.  The law of 
battery protects patients from unwanted or harmful physical contacts.  The patient 
has to demonstrate only that she did not consent to the touching that occurred, 
which includes the provision of medical treatment by an unwanted medical pro-
vider.58  Hence, to bring an action in battery, a patient must simply prove that any 
of the following occurred: an unconsented-to provider performed the desired pro-
cedure, an unconsented-to treatment or touching occurred, the healthcare provider 
performed a completely different procedure from that for which consent was given, 
the provider failed to explain the nature or character of a particular procedure that 
had been performed, or the provider performed a procedure on the wrong area of 
the body.  Proof of physical injury is not necessary under the battery doctrine.59  
Rather, the focus is on the patient’s right to be free from unconsented-to touching. 
Because of the very patient-friendly nature of the battery doctrine, courts in 
some jurisdictions sought to provide more freedom and protection to medical pro-
fessionals while promoting patient self-determination and autonomy in medical 
decisionmaking.60  They did so, beginning in the 1970s, by limiting the scope of the 
battery doctrine while establishing the modern doctrine of informed consent as a 
  
58. See Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905) (holding that good intentions were not a defense 
to a battery claim in a situation in which a patient consented to operation on her right ear, but her phy-
sician operated on the left ear instead after determining that it was in worse condition).  Informed 
consent differs from battery to the extent that a standard informed consent claim assumes that the 
patient has given technical consent to being touched by the defendant but that consent would not 
have been given if the physician had  appropriately disclosed the risks of the procedure.  See DAVID 
ORENTLICHER ET AL., BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 170 (2d ed. 2008). 
59. By comparison, under a negligence theory or under the informed consent doctrine, the plaintiff must show 
that he would have declined a procedure if he had known all the details and risks. 
60. See L. Song Richardson, When Human Experimentation Is Criminal, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
89, 96–97 (2009).  Medical malpractice reform in some jurisdictions has included abolishing informed 
consent’s battery basis altogether.  In other jurisdictions, such as Arizona, for example, the highest 
court has held a malpractice reform statute unconstitutional on the grounds that the state consti-
tution established a fundamental right to bring battery actions against a physician based on a common 
law theory of battery.  See Duncan v. Scottsdale Med. Imaging, Ltd., 70 P.3d 435, 443 (Ariz. 2003). 
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more balanced alternative.61  Today, disclosure, respect for patients’ autonomous 
decisionmaking, and the norms established by the battery doctrine are understood 
as fundamental medical ethics requirements.  These principles now undergird fed-
eral regulations on human experimentation and guide virtually all healthcare inter-
actions, including the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment and the refusal 
of treatment by an unwanted physician.62 
C. The Refusal of Unwanted Medical Care 
Informed consent rules and the battery doctrine form the foundation of a rich 
jurisprudence on the right to refuse medical treatment, which in turn informs how 
physicians and hospitals respond to a patient’s demands or refusals to be treated 
by a physician of a particular race.63  A competent patient—or a patient’s legally 
designated surrogate decisionmaker—has a common law and constitutionally pro-
tected right to refuse unwanted medical treatment.64  It follows, then, that a com-
petent patient has the right to refuse the care of a particular healthcare provider, 
and informed consent rules and the law of battery dictate that the patient’s wishes 
should control. 
In any situation in which a patient refuses medical treatment, the healthcare 
institution must first determine whether the patient is competent to make such a 
decision.65  If the institution deems the patient competent, then it must respect her 
wishes and cease all treatment.  Here, the focus is not on the reasonableness of the 
patient’s refusal but rather on the patient’s preference.66  During the determination 
of competence, or at any other time, it may appear as though the patient is not re-
  
61. See Andrew Jameton, Ethical Issues of Information Disclosure, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 
1225, 1226 (Warren T. Reich ed., rev. ed. 1995). 
62. See id. at 1227. 
63. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434 (N.J. 
1987); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985). 
64. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278, 280. 
65. Id.  A staff physician or psychologist typically determines competence.  If the patient is deemed incom-
petent, then a member of the patient’s family or a designated surrogate decisionmaker will be selected 
to make healthcare decisions on behalf of the patient.  Although some might argue that demanding 
or refusing treatment from a physician of a particular race constitutes a form of incompetence, such 
preferences do not necessarily indicate incompetence under the relevant standard.  The dominant 
test used to determine competence does not focus on competence as a social construct but instead 
asks whether the patient has demonstrated actual understanding of the ramifications of his or her 
decision.  The physician has an obligation to educate the patient and directly ascertain whether the 
patient has in fact understood.  If this test is met then the patient has provided informed consent.  See 
HALL ET AL., supra note 44, at 545. 
66. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278. 
478 60 UCLA L. REV. 462 (2012) 
 
fusing care per se but is instead refusing to receive treatment from a particular 
healthcare provider for prejudiced reasons.  In that case, standard medical ethics 
procedures require the hospital to assess whether there are underlying factors that 
may have prompted the request (such as determining whether the patient is expe-
riencing pressure from family members) and, if so, whether they can be addressed 
through means other than acceding to the patient’s biases (such as through the provi-
sion of counseling).67 
If, however, these factors are absent and the competent patient in the hospital 
setting cannot be swayed with respect to her demand for or refusal of a provider of 
a particular race, then the objected-to provider has a legal obligation to stop pro-
viding care immediately, and medical ethics counsel that the patient’s preferences 
should be accommodated.68 
D. EMTALA 
The cumulative effect of these legal doctrines and medical ethics default 
rules on the practice of hospitals accommodating patients’ racial preferences is 
compounded by EMTALA69 which imposes specific treatment obligations on 
Medicare-participating hospitals offering emergency services.70  In 1986, Congress 
enacted EMTALA because of concerns about widespread patient dumping—
hospitals’ denial of emergency care to the indigent, including the transfer or dis-
charge of emergency patients on the basis of high anticipated diagnosis or treatment 
costs.71  The law creates a duty of hospitals to perform a medical screening exami-
nation when requested by an individual who arrives in the emergency department 
in order to determine whether an emergency medical condition exists or whether 
the individual is experiencing active labor.72  EMTALA applies to anyone in need of  
  
67. Cf. Jacob M. Appel, The Dangers of the Underprivileged Ethicist: Revising the Rules of Evidence After 
the Bioethics Revolution, 42 N.M. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2012) (describing the ethics consultation process). 
68. See Aasim I. Padela & Imran R.A. Punekar, Emergency Medical Practice: Advancing Cultural 
Competence and Reducing Health Care Disparities, 16 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 69, 71 (2008). 
69. Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 9121(b), 100 Stat. 82, 164–67 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395dd (2006)). 
70. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. 
71. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-241, pt. 1, at 27 (1986) (reflecting congressional intent to prevent patient 
dumping with EMTALA), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 579, 605; see also Burditt v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Health & Human Servs., 934 F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1991) (enforcing EMTALA’s antidumping 
provisions for the first time). 
72. See Burditt, 934 F.2d at 1370; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.  The law defines an “emergency medical 
condition” as one that is manifest “by acute symptoms of sufficient severity . . . such that the absence 
of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in: placing [the patient’s 
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medical treatment, regardless of citizenship, legal status, or ability to pay.73 
Notably, the EMTALA-imposed duties apply not only to those who come 
to an emergency department presenting an emergency medical condition but also to 
any individual who arrives anywhere on the hospital premises requesting medical 
treatment, irrespective of whether the person is visibly in need of emergency care.74  
The law establishes no duty to provide continuing medical treatment; however, if, 
during the EMTALA-mandated medical screening an emergency medical con-
dition or active labor is diagnosed, then it is incumbent on the hospital either to 
stabilize the individual and provide emergency care or to arrange to transfer the 
patient, with her consent, to a facility that is able to provide appropriate treat-
ment.75  A physician must certify in writing that the medical benefits of the transfer 
outweigh the risks to the patient.  In addition, the receiving hospital must be capa-
ble of providing the needed treatment and must agree to the transfer.76  A patient 
also has the right under EMTALA to request a transfer.77  Before the hospital can 
exercise this option, however, it must first provide the treatment necessary to min-
imize the risks posed by the transfer.78 
E. The Operation of the Default Legal Regime 
Informed consent obligations, the right to refuse unwanted medical treat-
ment, the law of battery, and the EMTALA-mandated duty may together present 
an ethical bind and potential legal liability for hospitals dealing with a patient who 
wants to obtain or avoid care by a physician of a particular race.  Hospital emer-
gency departments serve diverse patient populations, including individuals too 
impoverished to obtain basic healthcare services elsewhere and individuals who re-
quire urgent medical treatment.  Patients who seek treatment in hospital emergen-
cy departments are typically in poor health and vulnerable, and may be in desperate 
need of acute care.  These individuals have few, if any, alternate venues where they 
can receive the type of urgent, and often life-saving, treatment offered in a hospital 
setting.  If a patient who desires treatment will not yield in his preference for a 
  
health] . . . in serious jeopardy, serious impairment to bodily functions, or serious dysfunction of any 
bodily organ or part.”  See id. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A). 
73. See id. §§ 1395dd(a). 
74. As mentioned above, this applies to hospitals that receive Medicare funds and that provide emer-
gency services.  See id. §§ 1395dd(a), (b)(1). 
75. See id. § 1395dd(b)(1). 
76. See id. § 1395dd(c)(1). 
77. See id. § 1395dd(b)(1)(B). 
78. See id. § 1395dd(c)(2)(A). 
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provider of a particular race and will not agree to a transfer, then the hospital is 
faced with the dilemma of choosing between (1) having a physician unwanted by 
the patient forcibly perform the EMTALA-mandated medical screening, thereby 
violating informed consent and battery laws, and (2) rejecting the patient in viola-
tion of EMTALA, thereby risking liability and the chance that this decision will 
cause the patient to suffer, experience grievous harm, or die. 
Further, hospital emergency departments operate under significant time 
pressures, as often the needs of individuals seeking treatment are immediate.79  As 
a result, even the delay caused by a hospital deciding between these options could 
result in death or in imminent, serious bodily injury to the patient and thus con-
travene the physician’s ethical duty to provide appropriate treatment.  Thus, in this 
legal regime, the failure to accede to patients’ racial preferences presents healthcare 
providers with two equally vexing options, both of which carry the risk of legal 
sanction. 
Although the accommodation of patient racial preference in the hospital set-
ting appears to be consistent with EMTALA and medical ethics norms and prac-
tice, does this accommodation violate accepted notions of racial equality?  Part III 
addresses this question in detail. 
III. DOES THE LAW SPEAK TO THIS ISSUE?: PATIENT PREFERENCE 
DISCRIMINATION AND THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 
The question looming in any inquiry into the propriety of hospitals accom-
modating patients’ racial preferences with respect to their choice of physician is 
whether the practice is legal.  Indeed, it is difficult to imagine preferences of this 
sort indulged in any other sector.  What is so unique about medicine and the hos-
pital setting that we would accept uses of race that would clearly be deemed prob-
lematic, even offensive, in other arenas?  In determining the legal legitimacy of this 
practice, we must look to antidiscrimination laws for guidance. 
Titles II, VI, and VII of the CRA, the most prominent civil rights statute 
enacted since Reconstruction, outlawed discrimination against individuals based 
on race, color, or national origin.80  This broadly remedial, landmark legislation 
  
79. Padela & Punekar, supra note 68, at 71. 
80. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a(a), 2000d, 2000e-2(a).  Titles II and VII also protect 
against discrimination based on religion.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a(a), 2000e-2(a).  Titles II, VI, and 
VII do not specifically define race but rather rely on the classifications delineated in the U.S. Office 
of Management and Budget’s (OMB) Directive No. 15.  The OMB recognizes the following cate-
gories: American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, Black or African American, Hispanic or Latino, 
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was passed at a time when discrimination was rampant and practiced openly in vir-
tually every aspect of public life.  Individuals were routinely denied access to public 
establishments because of their membership in a disfavored minority group, and 
with rare exceptions, health and social service organizations in the United States 
were segregated by race.81 
Antidiscrimination laws have been quite effective at curbing blatant race dis-
crimination in most public contexts, but does their reach extend to hospitals yield-
ing to patients’ racial biases?  This Part examines the antidiscrimination laws that 
bear on this practice, including Titles II, VI, and VII of the CRA.  It contends 
that these laws fail to offer a clear legal directive on the issues of healthcare pro-
viders accommodating patients’ racial preferences, and that this practice does not, 
in fact, constitute the type of invidious discrimination envisioned by the drafters 
of the CRA.  This Part further argues that although acceding to patients’ race-
based requests may appear to contravene antidiscrimination norms, it is actually 
consistent with principles of antisubordination and racial equality.  
A. Customer Preference Discrimination in Public Accommodations  
Under Title II 
Title II of the CRA proscribes discrimination by a commercial entity yield-
ing to the racial preferences of its customers.82  It covers discrimination based on 
race, color, religion, or national origin by public accommodations “affecting inter-
state commerce,” which the law defines as hotels, motels, restaurants, theaters, gas 
stations, bars, recreation areas, and places of exhibition or entertainment.83  The 
  
Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, and White.  See Revisions to the Standards for the 
Classification of Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity, 62 Fed. Reg. 58,782, 58,782 (Oct. 30, 1997). 
81. See SMITH, supra note 2, at 12.  Until the mid-twentieth century, the overwhelming majority of 
orphanages, private charitable hospitals, local almshouses, and state facilities served only whites.  See 
id.  Congress legitimized healthcare segregation when, in 1946, it enacted the Hospital Survey and 
Construction Act (the Hill-Burton Act), Pub. L. No. 79-725, 60 Stat. 1041 (1946) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 291 to 291o-1), which authorized the construction of segregated hospitals 
and nursing homes.  By March 1964, of the more than three thousand Hill-Burton construction 
projects, 104 segregated facilities had been built: eighty-four for whites only and twenty for blacks.  
See BYRD & CLAYTON, supra note 1, at 267. 
82. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a). 
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b), (b)(4) (covering “[e]stablishments affecting interstate commerce or sup-
ported in their activities by State action as places of public accommodation; lodgings; facilities prin-
cipally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises; gasoline stations; places of exhibition 
or entertainment; [and] other covered establishments,” including “any establishment which is phy-
sically located within the premises of any establishment otherwise covered by this subsection, or 
within the premises of which is physically located any such covered establishment, and which holds 
itself out as serving patrons of such covered establishment”). 
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law was enacted specifically to grant racial minorities full access to public facilities 
and precludes the owners of such facilities from justifying discrimination by argu-
ing that customers prefer to be served by or share the premises with only individ-
uals of a particular race.  Hence, a restaurant would violate Title II if it succumbed 
to a customer request for a waiter of a race different from that of the one assigned.  
Title II clearly prohibits customer preference discrimination, and while the 
norms and goals that structure Title II might, at first glance, appear applicable to 
the hospital context, the Act does not govern this practice because “hospitals are 
not listed among the establishments to which Title II applies.”84  Indeed, courts 
have uniformly held that Title II “sets forth a comprehensive list of establishments 
that qualify as a place of public accommodation and in so doing excludes from its 
coverage those categories of establishments not listed.”85  The “establishments 
covered by the federal statute do not include hospitals”;86 therefore, Title II cannot 
be understood to govern the practice of hospitals complying with patients’ requests 
for physicians of the same race. 
B. Customer Preference Discrimination in Employment Under Title VII 
Title VII of the CRA is the primary federal statute addressing employment 
discrimination.  It specifically prohibits employers from discriminating, by motiva-
tion or impact, against persons because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; 
and it applies to discrimination with respect to “compensation, terms, conditions, 
or privileges of employment.”87  
The law also makes clear that an employer’s wish to cater to the actual or im-
agined discriminatory preferences of its clientele is generally not a valid defense for 
treating employees differently based on protected characteristics.88  Thus, for ex-
  
84. Foster v. Howard Univ. Hosp., No. Civ.A. 06-244, 2006 WL 2938701, at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 13, 
2006); see also Verhagen v. Olarte, No. 89 Civ. 0300, 1989 WL 146265, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 
1989) (observing that “Congress went to the effort of specifying those establishments which con-
stitute places of public accommodation under § 2000a”). 
85. Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc., 456 F.3d 427, 431 (4th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted); see also Kalantar v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 402 F. Supp. 2d 130, 
139 (D.D.C. 2005) (dismissing the Title II claim brought by an Iranian airline passenger because 
none of the establishments enumerated in the statute “even remotely resembles an airline, or indeed 
any other vehicle or mode of transportation”). 
86. Verhagen, 1989 WL 146265, at *4. 
87. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
88. See id. § 2000e-2(a)(2); see also Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 
833, 841 (2001) (“Insofar as the employer . . . fails to give the employee or customer something he de-
sires because of traits that are irrelevant to his economic function, he is breaching the duty to avoid 
simple discrimination.”). 
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ample, a provider of security services cannot bow to customer preferences for male 
security guards by reassigning women to inconvenient, lower-paid positions;89 nor 
can a telephone marketing firm succumb to a client request that only black employ-
ees call black households and white employees call white households.90 
The accommodation of patients’ racial preferences in the hospital context, 
however, is decidedly not the typical Title VII scenario; nor does it conform neatly 
with the types of discrimination that Title VII was enacted to address, which may ex-
plain why physicians have not objected to, and indeed have continued to indulge, 
patients’ racial preferences.  In fact, there is no case law directly addressing this prac-
tice.  The only case that comes close to broaching this issue is Chaney v. Plainfield 
Healthcare Center,91 in which a black certified nursing assistant (CNA) sued her 
employer, a nursing home, for race discrimination under Title VII.92  She alleged 
that she was subjected to a racially hostile work environment and based her claim, 
in part, on the fact that the nursing home distributed daily a written assignment 
schedule for all employees that indicated each patient who “prefers no black 
CNAs.”93  The Seventh Circuit held that Title VII prohibits nursing homes from 
making staffing decisions based on their residents’ racially biased wishes with re-
spect to CNAs.94  
  
89. See EEOC v. Guardsmark, LLC, No. H-09-3062, 2010 WL 5391269, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 
2010); see also Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1274 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that the 
company’s contention that its “Latin American clients would react negatively to a woman vice-
president” did not constitute a valid justification under Title VII for the company’s failure to promote 
a female employee to the position); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 
1971) (holding that the airline’s refusal to hire males as flight attendants violated Title VII); Wilson 
v. Sw. Airlines, Inc., 880 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that an airline’s policy of hiring only fe-
male flight attendants violated Title VII). 
90. Ferrill v. Parker Grp., Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 477 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that a client’s request that the 
telemarketing firm “race match” its get-out-the-vote calls to households by requiring black employ-
ees to call black voters using a “black” script, while requiring white employees to call white voters using 
a “white” script, provided no defense to a violation of the CRA); see also Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 
170 F.3d 734, 744 (7th Cir. 1999) (invalidating an employer’s maintenance of a segregated sales 
force under Title VII); Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1530–31 (7th Cir. 1990) (discussing 
how Title VII would preclude an employer’s refusal to hire African American workers because the 
employer believed that his customers did not like African Americans); Jatczak v. Ochburg, 540 F. 
Supp. 698 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (holding that an employer cannot rely on gender or racial categories 
when hiring a social worker whose work would include serving as a positive role model for young ur-
ban black men); EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, SECTION 15: RACE AND COLOR DISCRIMINATION 
15-12 (2006) (explaining that Title VII is violated when an employer decides not to hire an African 
American aide because the employer believes that its non–African American clientele would be un-
comfortable with an African American aide). 
91. 612 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2010). 
92. Id. at 910. 
93. Id. 
94. Id.  
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Although on its face this case bears a resemblance to physicians accommo-
dating patients’ racial preferences in the hospital setting, it is distinguishable in 
ways that may explain why physicians are not challenging this practice despite its 
prevalence.  Most notably, unlike the situation in Chaney, the decision to accede to 
patients’ requests for same-race physicians is made not by hospital administrators 
but rather by physicians who are deciding among themselves how best to meet each 
patient’s needs.  As I explain, physicians’ willingness to accommodate is likely due 
to the unique nature of the physician–patient relationship, which contrasts sharply 
with that of a CNA and nursing home resident.  
For example, in Chaney, the court appropriately rejected the nursing home’s 
attempt tacitly to exploit a narrow exception to Title VII’s antidiscrimination 
mandate.  This exception, known as a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ), 
allows employers openly and legitimately to base employment decisions on sex, 
religion, or national origin—but not race, which is explicitly excluded.95  The spe-
cific characteristic or attribute must be necessary to the ordinary operation of the 
particular business or enterprise.96  More than simply job related, the qualification 
must be “compelling,” “overriding,” or inextricably linked to the central mission or 
essence of the job.97  Thus, the BFOQ defense would permit a theater to hire ac-
tors on the basis of gender, or an advertiser of men’s clothing lawfully to advertise 
exclusively for and hire only male models.98  The employer bears the responsibil-
  
95. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2006). 
96. See id. (requiring the discrimination to be “reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that par-
ticular business or enterprise”); see also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335–37 (1977) (finding 
that a maximum security prison, where males were segregated on the basis of their level of danger-
ousness, was permitted under Title VII’s BFOQ to have a policy that precluded the hiring of women 
as correctional counselors in a contact position with inmates). 
97. See Huisenga v. Opus Corp., 494 N.W.2d 469, 472–73 (Minn. 1992); Kraft, Inc. v. State, 284 
N.W.2d 386, 388 (Minn. 1979); Melissa K. Stull, Permissible Sex Discrimination in Employment 
Based on Bona Fide Occupational Qualifications (BFOQ) Under § 7039(e)(1) of Title VII of Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 (42 USCS § 2000e-2(e)(1)), 110 A.L.R. FED. 28 (1992); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private 
Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining Permissible Sex Discrimination, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 147, 184–
91 (2004); Amy Kapczynski, Note, Same-Sex Privacy and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 112 
YALE L.J. 1257, 1259–60 (2003). 
98. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidelines emphasize both the 
narrowness of the BFOQ defense and its general permissibility for authenticity purposes, such as 
hiring women to model maternity clothes in advertisements.  See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (2012); see 
also Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 
DUKE L.J. 365; Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands of Analysis 
Under Title VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1079 (2010); Russell K. Robinson, Casting and Caste-ing: Reconciling 
Artistic Freedom and Antidiscrimination Norms, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2007). 
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ity of demonstrating that all or substantially all members of the group(s) excluded 
from the job would be unable to perform the duties of the position.99  
The BFOQ defense may also be used as a defense against a charge of accom-
modating customer preferences in a very limited number of circumstances in which 
customer privacy is a concern.100  Thus, for example, although the BFOQ defense 
will not serve as a valid justification for an airline to hire only women as flight at-
tendants to comply with male customer preferences,101 the privacy interests of psy-
chiatric patients can justify a BFOQ for personal hygiene attendants of the same 
sex.102  To this end, courts have held that for certain workers, such as nursing assis-
tants, hospital delivery room nursing staff, and others involved in assisting individ-
uals with dressing, disrobing, or bathing, gender may be a legitimate BFOQ for 
accommodating patients’ privacy or modesty interests.103  In Chaney, however, the 
  
99. See, e.g., UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 207 (1991) (stating that the employer may 
not exclude women of childbearing age from certain jobs that involve the handling of lead even 
though the employer alleges that lead could be harmful to fetuses). 
100. See Jennings v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Health, 786 F. Supp. 376, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Backus 
v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191, 1193–96 (E.D. Ark. 1981); Fesel v. Masonic Home of 
Del., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1350–51 (D. Del. 1978), aff’d without opinion, 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 
1979).  To a lesser extent, courts have also permitted sex-based customer preference discrimination 
in cases where explicit sexuality is a central feature of the business or enterprise, such as strip clubs.  
See, e.g., St. Cross v. Playboy Club, Inc., No. CSF 22618-70, Appeal No. 773 (N.Y. State Human 
Rights Appeals Bd. Dec. 17, 1971); Weber v. Playboy Club, Inc., No. CSF 22619-70, Appeal No. 
774 (N.Y. Human Rights Appeals Bd. Dec. 17, 1971) (holding that Playboy Club, Inc. does not en-
gage in a discriminatory practice when hiring female employees based on physical attributes appeal-
ing to its customers); 3 LEX K. LARSON ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 43.02[2], at 
43-5 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing burlesque, go-go, and chorus-line dancers); Larry Alexander, What 
Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. 
REV. 149, 205–06 (1992) (addressing strip clubs); Yuracko, supra note 97, at 181. 
101. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971); see also Wilson v. Sw. 
Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 299–304 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (finding that Title VII’s BFOQ defense 
was not available to a defendant airline that sought to pander to male business travelers by hiring only 
female flight attendants and dressing them in “hot pants”). 
102. Local 567, AFSCME v. Michigan, 635 F. Supp. 1010, 1013 (E.D. Mich. 1986). 
103. See, e.g., Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that 
BFOQ defense was established where psychiatric hospital staff treated emotionally disturbed and sex-
ually abused children and adolescents who “often [had to be] accompanied to the bathroom, and 
sometimes . . . bathed”); Wilson v. Chertoff, 699 F. Supp. 2d 364, 372–73 (D. Mass. 2010) (de-
termining that the Transportation Security Administration may engage in gender-based employ-
ment actions to allow for same-sex screening for body pat-downs); Jones v. Hinds Gen. Hosp., 666 
F. Supp. 933, 935 (S.D. Miss. 1987) (“The job duties of male and female nurse assistants and male 
orderlies often require that such employee view or touch the private parts of their patients.”); EEOC 
v. Mercy Health Ctr., No. Civ. 80-1374-W, 1982 WL 3108 (W.D. Okla. 1982) (holding that a hos-
pital may refuse to hire men to work as nurses in the labor and delivery units without violating Title 
VII because female patients would not feel comfortable with male nurses); Brooks v. ACF Indus., 
Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1122, 1133 (S.D. W. Va. 1982) (holding that the male gender was a BFOQ for 
washroom and bathhouse attendants); Fesel, 447 F. Supp. at 1352–53 (stating that sex is a perm-
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court correctly held that race is not a relevant factor to consider in addressing pri-
vacy concerns, nor is it relevant to the work of CNAs.104 
The practice of physicians accommodating patients’ racial preferences, in 
contrast, has not been challenged by physicians nor has it been framed as a 
BFOQ.  This may be due to the fact that unlike the prototypical BFOQ situa-
tion, the relationship between physician and patient in the hospital context is 
not defined by issues of personal modesty but is instead fundamentally diag-
nostic and therapeutic.  Thus, if physicians were challenging this practice—and 
they are not—then they would have to contend not with a BFOQ defense, but 
perhaps rather a claim based on the intimate, therapeutic, and diagnostic nature 
of the physician–patient relationship.105  This relationship, to be effective, is 
highly dependent on trust, productive communication, mutual respect, cooper-
ation, participatory decisionmaking, and caring.106  A patient must be willing to 
speak candidly about personal and potentially uncomfortable or embarrassing 
information; to submit to bodily examination, including attention to all manner 
  
issible BFOQ at a nursing home that “has the responsibility of providing twenty-four hour supervision 
and care of its elderly guests.  Fulfillment of that responsibility necessitates intimate personal care 
including dressing, bathing, toilet assistance, geriatric pad changes and catheter care.  Each of these 
functions involves a personal touching . . . .”). 
104. Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 612 F.3d 908, 910 (7th Cir. 2010). 
105. Notably, the statutory argument just explored arguably also has constitutional dimensions that 
sound in the Supreme Court’s intimate association cases.  See Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary 
Club, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987); see also Fair Hous. Council v. Roommate.com, LLC, 666 F.3d 
1216, 1221–22 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting the intimate associational rights of cohabiting nonrelatives).  
The physician–patient relationship would presumably satisfy the “size, purpose, selectivity, and . . . 
exclu[sion of others] from critical aspects of the relationship” test set out in the Court’s cases.  See 
Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 536.  Like other intimate relationships deemed protected by these prece-
dents, it typically involves two individuals and elements of trust, selectivity, communication, and 
cooperative decisionmaking.  See Elizabeth A. Pector, How Patients Really Choose Their Doctors, 77 
MED. ECON. 154 (2000); cf. Jean Abraham et al., Selecting a Provider: What Factors Influence 
Patients’ Decision-Making?, 56 J. HEALTHCARE MGMT 99, 110 (2011).  Patients seeking accom-
modation of their race-based preferences in care thus might reasonably explore an intimate associa-
tion claim, though its likelihood of success given cases in other areas is not certain.  See Norwood v. 
Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469–70 (1973).  Importantly, hospitals and other institutions whose actions 
fall under Title VII and other similar state and local laws could not resort to this claim in defending 
themselves against actions or policies requiring accommodation of race-based preferences.  See 
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984) (holding that the right of intimate association does 
not apply to “large commercial enterprises”).  Hospitals may, however, be able to raise the constitu-
tional claim on behalf of their patients.  See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 195 (1976). 
106. See Cooper et al., supra note 20, at 913 tbl.3; Thomas A. LaVeist et al., Attitudes About Racism, Medical 
Mistrust, and Satisfaction With Care Among African American and White Cardiac Patients, 57 MED. 
CARE RES. & REV., supp. 1, 2000 at 146, 146–47; Michelle van Ryn & Jane Burke, The Effect of 
Patient Race and Socio-economic Status on Physicians’ Perceptions of Patients, 50 SOC. SCI. & MED. 813, 
823 (2000). 
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of injury and abuse;107 to confide in and communicate openly with the physi-
cian;108 to rely on the physician’s recommendations; and to feel confident in the 
belief that the physician is acting to advance the patient’s best interest.109  In fact, 
the absence of these elements may mean the difference between life and death for 
some patients.  To this end, the AMA has consistently and unequivocally main-
tained that a patient’s ability to choose a personal physician is a “prerequisite of 
optimal care and ethical practice.”110 
Even beyond the intimately therapeutic character of the physician–patient 
relationship, there is strong empirical support for the medical efficacy of respect-
ing patients’ wishes with regard to their choice of physician.  Indeed, as I demon-
strate in Part IV, several studies show that this practice can benefit some patients 
tremendously.111  In addition, physicians overwhelmingly believe that their primary 
obligation is to provide the best possible care to individual patients since, according 
  
107. See generally AMA Code of Medical Ethics, Opinion 2.02—Physicians’ Obligations in Preventing, 
Identifying, and Treating Violence and Abuse (2008), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/ 
pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion202.page (discussing physi-
cians’ duty to ask questions and conduct patient physical examinations with an eye to detecting abuse). 
108. See David Orentlicher, Health Care Reform and the Patient–Physician Relationship, 5 HEALTH 
MATRIX, 141, 147–48 (1995).  Recent data shows that trust is a central element of the physician–
patient relationship.  See generally Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 
469, 478–82 (2002) (providing comprehensive discussion of the nature and significance of trust and 
discussing empirical research showing that trust has therapeutic benefits, including the placebo 
effect); Mark A. Hall, The Importance of Trust for Ethics, Law, and Public Policy, 14 CAMBRIDGE Q. 
HEALTHCARE ETHICS 156 (2005) (discussing a growing recognition of the importance of trust and 
surveying competing public policy theories about trust).  See also Robert Gatter, Faith, Confidence, 
and Health Care: Fostering Trust in Medicine Through Law, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 395, 399–
400, 416–17 (2004) (noting that “researchers have established a positive correlation between medical 
trust and certain desirable health-related behaviors” by patients and also questioning the placebo 
effect); Mark A. Hall, Can You Trust a Doctor You Can’t Sue?, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 303 (2005) 
(discussing the implications of malpractice reform on medical trust); Mark A. Hall & Robert A. 
Berenson, Ethical Practice in Managed Care: A Dose of Realism, 128 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 395, 
396–97 (1998) (“[T]he primary goal of role-based medical ethics [in the context of physician fin-
ancial incentives] should be the preservation of patients’ trust in their physicians.  Trust is important 
primarily because of its therapeutic role, not simply because of its intrinsic, theoretical value.”). 
109. See AMA Code of Medical Ethics, Opinion 10.015—The Patient–Physician Relationship (2001) 
[hereinafter Opinion 10.015], available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/ 
medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion10015.page (“The relationship between patient and phy-
sician is based on trust and gives rise to physicians’ ethical obligations to place patients’ welfare above 
their own self-interest and above obligations to other groups, and to advocate for their patients’ wel-
fare.”).  
110. Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 1277, 1282 (Ariz. 1999); see Ohio Urology, Inc. v. Poll, 
594 N.E.2d 1027, 1030 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); AMA Code of Medical Ethics, Opinion 9.06—
Free Choice (1977), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-
ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion906.page. 
111. See infra Part IV.A. 
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to the AMA Code of Ethics, physicians have “ethical obligations to place patients’ 
welfare above their own self-interest and above obligations to other groups, and to 
advocate for their patients’ welfare.”112  Thus, to the extent that they must occa-
sionally accommodate patients’ racial preferences to satisfy patients’ healthcare 
needs, then the general sentiment among physicians, as explained by one doctor, 
is that “[w]hile it can be difficult, . . . emergency physicians are there to serve their 
patients, not act on desires to make a point and try to correct a patient’s perception 
of the world.”113 
In addition, physicians may not be challenging the practice of accommodat-
ing patients’ racial preferences because it does not disparately burden physicians of 
a particular race, as data revealing the racial diversity of the patients making these 
types of requests may suggest.114  Several studies have found that when presented 
with a choice, patients of all racial and ethnic backgrounds tend to choose physi-
cians of their own group, and all racial and ethnic groups express greater satisfaction 
with the quality of their care when they are racially concordant with their physi-
cian.115  Finally, physicians’ decisions to accommodate may also be based on a 
belief that patients whose wishes are not respected may be more likely to sue their 
physicians if something goes wrong.116  Studies show that patients who dislike or 
disapprove of their healthcare providers are more likely to file malpractice claims 
against their providers.117  
All told, the unique nature of the physician–patient relationship, the fact that 
this relationship may be constitutionally protected, the significance of race in the 
therapeutic enterprise, the fact that the accommodation of patients’ racial prefer-
ences in the hospital setting does not appear to adversely affect physicians by race, 
and the evidence demonstrating that acceding to patients’ requests has been shown 
to increase patient satisfaction and improve care all distinguish this practice from 
the types of discrimination that Title VII was intended to address. 
  
112. Opinion 10.015, supra note 109. 
113. Benton, supra note 3, at 23. 
114. Cf. Padela et al., supra note 3, at 466 (asserting that patients of minority backgrounds had signifi-
cantly greater accommodation scores than those from majority backgrounds). 
115. See LaVeist & Nuru-Jeter, supra note 22, at 296; Saha et al., supra note 21, at 78–79. 
116. This observation is based on data obtained through author interviews with physicians from September 
2011 through July 2012. 
117. See, e.g., H.P. Forster et al., Reducing Legal Risk by Practicing Patient-Centered Medicine, 162 ARCHIVES 
INTERNAL MED. 1217, 1219 (2002) (analyzing several studies and demonstrating that physicians 
may be able to minimize malpractice claims by treating their patients with respectful and genuine at-
tention); Henry T. Stelfox, The Relation of Patient Satisfaction With Complaints Against Physicians 
and Malpractice Lawsuits, 118 AM. J. MED. 1126, 1131 (2005) (demonstrating that patients are more 
likely to file malpractice suits against physicians when they are dissatisfied with them). 
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C. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 
Title VI of the CRA provides that no person “shall, on the grounds of race, 
color or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits 
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving fed-
eral financial assistance.”118  This law was enacted partly as a means of eradicating 
de jure racial segregation within and among healthcare facilities.119  Although Title 
VI is ambiguous with respect to its scope and practical applications,120 the statute 
expressly covers hospitals and targets racially discriminatory actions against actual 
and potential patients by healthcare institutions, including denial of healthcare 
benefits and services.121  Title VI has been a powerful force in eliminating the type 
of discrimination described at the outset of this Article.  The law has never been 
interpreted as governing the accommodation of patients’ racial preferences in fed-
erally funded hospitals, however, and there are several reasons to believe that this 
practice does not fall within the ambit of Title VI. 
As a threshold matter, it must be determined who would have standing to 
bring suit challenging the practice.  The patient who is seeking the accommodation 
is unlikely to challenge the hospital’s decision to comply with the request.  A phy-
sician who sought to challenge a hospitals’ staffing decision made in response to a 
patient’s request for physician race concordance would be required to raise her 
claim under Title VII because “any employment practice of any employer . . . except 
  
118. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006). 
119. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TITLE VI LEGAL MANUAL 3–6 (1998), available at http://www. 
justice.gov/crt/grants_statutes/legalman.pdf.  While Title VI has effectively eliminated de jure racial 
segregation, the law has been much less successful at eradicating more subtle forms of discrimination 
and facially neutral policies and practices that may have a disparate impact on minority communities.  
For example, hospitals limit the number of beds available to Medicaid patients, relocate to wealthier 
or predominately white neighborhoods or suburbs in which minorities cannot easily access services, 
such as in NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 330 (D. Del. 1978), or close or 
relocate certain services thought to be appealing to low-income patients, such as emergency or ob-
stetrics care.  Managed care companies engage in “redlining” and “cherry-picking” practices to ex-
clude high-risk, high-cost patients, including many minorities.  See Meridel J. Bulle-Vu, Statistical 
Intent: A Post-Sandoval Litigation Strategy for Title VI ‘Impact’ Cases, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & 
POL’Y 461, 466 (2010).  In addition, municipalities may convert public and nonprofit healthcare 
facilities to for-profit status.  See Vernellia R. Randall, Racist Health Care: Reforming an Unjust Health 
Care System to Meet the Need of African-Americans, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 127, 150 (1993). 
120. See ROY L. BROOKS, CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION: CASES AND PERSPECTIVES 204 (2d ed. 2000). 
121. See 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(i)–(vi) (2011).  For example, the specific discriminatory actions prohibited 
under Title VI include denying services or benefits, providing inferior services or benefits, segrega-
ting services, restricting patients’ “enjoyment of any advantage or privileges enjoyed by others” receiv-
ing the services or benefits, and discriminating in enrollment or eligibility.  Id.  
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where a primary objective of the Federal financial assistance is to provide employ-
ment”122 is explicitly exempted from the scope of Title VI. 
Further, the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected a private right of action to en-
force Title VI’s regulations prohibiting disparate impact discrimination.123  Hence, 
if a federally funded entity fails to comply with these regulations, Title VI allows 
only the funding agency to enforce them.124  However, the practice of accommo-
dating patients’ racial preferences has no disproportionate adverse effect on patients 
of a particular race because the practice does not deny patients the opportunity to 
enjoy the benefits of, or partake in the services rendered by, a federally funded hos-
pital. 
In addition, Title VI applies only to intentional discrimination125 and explic-
itly targets racially discriminatory actions by hospitals that deny patients the chance 
to participate in federally funded healthcare benefits and services.126  Even if dis-
crimination by patients or hospitals against physicians were within the purview of 
Title VI, the intent behind indulging patients’ requests for a physician of a partic-
ular race is not to discriminate against physicians but rather to provide optimal 
care to each patient.  And, ironically, this practice may be one of the best available 
means of enforcing Title VI’s mandate to enable individuals to enjoy the benefits 
of a covered entity or program, regardless of race, color, or national origin. 
Studies are increasingly reporting that the accommodation of patients’ racial 
preferences with respect to their choice of physician in the hospital context may 
counter the effects of implicit bias, discrimination, and stereotyping by physicians, 
  
122. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3.  Only federally funded employment programs are subject to Title VI penalties 
for the type of race or national origin discrimination proscribed by Title VII of the CRA. 
123. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001). 
124. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1.  Federal agencies may enforce the regulations either by refusing to grant or by 
terminating funds upon an administrative determination of noncompliance with the regulations.  
Funding agencies are also required to coordinate their enforcement efforts with the U.S. Attorney 
General.  See id.; Exec. Order No. 12,250, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,995 (Nov. 2, 1980). 
125. Title VI adopts the Fourteenth Amendment’s standard of proof for intentional discrimination.  See 
Elston v. Talladega Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1405 n.11, 1407 n.14 (11th Cir. 1993).  
Although Title VI expressly provides only for administrative enforcement, the Supreme Court has 
implied a private cause of action for individuals to enforce both the statute and the implementing 
regulations that prohibit intentional discrimination.  See Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 
463 U.S. 582, 597 (1983).  In Guardians, a majority of the Court held that proof of discriminatory 
intent is necessary for a violation of the statute itself, while a different majority held that discrimin-
atory impact is sufficient to state some type of claim under Title VI.  See id. at 608 n.1 (Powell, J., 
joined by Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 612 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); id. at 612 n.1 (O’Connor, 
J., concurring); id. at 642 (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan, J., and Blackmun, J., dissenting).  But see 
Alexander, 532 U.S. at 293 (holding that there is no private right of action to enforce the Title VI 
disparate impact regulations). 
126. See 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(i)–(vi). 
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which negatively affect patient health and contribute to the widespread health dis-
parities among racial and ethnic groups in the United States.127  Health disparities 
among racial groups are well documented, as overwhelming evidence demon-
strates that racial and ethnic minorities experience poorer-quality healthcare than 
white Americans, even when controlling for factors such as insurance status and 
income.128  Life expectancy and infant mortality are both considered important in-
dicators of population health and are critical gauges of access to and quality of med-
ical care, socioeconomic conditions, maternal health, and public health practices.129  
Although life expectancy in the United States increased during the twentieth cen-
tury, the infant mortality rate for African Americans is up to three times higher 
than that of other races,130 and African American life expectancy at birth remains 
more than four years below that of European Americans.131  The mortality rate is 
  
127. See Neil S. Calman, Out of the Shadow, 19 HEALTH AFF. 170, 172–74 (explaining how racial preju-
dices affect and limit patients’ healthcare opportunities); Chen et al., supra note 21, at 142; Alexander 
R. Green et al., Implicit Bias Among Physicians and Its Prediction of Thrombolysis Decisions for Black and 
White Patients, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1231 (2007); Haider et al., supra note 22, at 949 
(“[R]ace . . . biases held by physicians are increasingly recognized as potential factors contributing to 
disparities in health care.”); Padela & Punekar, supra note 68, at 72 (“Bias is an inevitable force that 
may manifest through stereotyping patients and plays a role in creating health care disparities.”); 
Thomas E. Perez, The Civil Rights Dimension of Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Health Status, in 
UNEQUAL TREATMENT, supra note 22, at 626, 628, 633, 636–37 (discussing how racial discrimi-
nation is subtle yet ongoing); Janice A. Sabin et al., Physician Implicit Attitudes and Stereotypes About 
Race and Quality of Medical Care, 46 MED. CARE 678 (2008); Kevin A. Schulman et al., The Effect 
of Race and Sex on Physicians’ Recommendations for Cardiac Catheterization, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
618, 618, 623–24 (1999) (discussing how race and sex influence physician recommendations in the 
treatment of cardiovascular disease); Michelle van Ryn & Steven S. Fu, Paved With Good Intentions: 
Do Public Health and Human Service Providers Contribute to Racial/Ethnic Disparities in Health?, 93 
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 248 (2003); Melba J.T. Vasquez, Cultural Difference and the Therapeutic 
Alliance: An Evidence-Based Analysis, 62 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 878 (2007); David R. Williams, 
Race, Socioeconomic Status, and Health: The Added Effects of Racism and Discrimination, 896 ANNALS 
N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 173, 177–80 (1999); David R. Williams & Chiquita Collins, Racial Residential 
Segregation: A Fundamental Cause of Racial Disparities in Health, 116 PUB. HEALTH REP. 404, 405–
07 (2001).  See generally UNEQUAL TREATMENT, supra note 22. 
128. See AM. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS, RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE, UPDATED 
2010, at 1 (2010). 
129. For information on average life expectancies in the United States, see Life Expectancy, CDC.GOV, 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/lifexpec.htm (last updated May 16, 2012). 
130. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2011, at 98 
(2012), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus11.pdf; MARIAN F. MACDORMAN & 
T.J. MATHEWS, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, NCHS DATA BRIEF NO. 9, RECENT 
TRENDS IN INFANT MORTALITY IN THE UNITED STATES (2008), available at http://www.cdc. 
gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db09.htm. 
131. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 130, at 108 tbl.22.  The life expec-
tancy gap is up to eight years in some states.  See Nazleen Bharmal et al., State-Level Variations in 
Racial Disparities in Life Expectancy, 47 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 544, 546–47 (2012).   
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21 percent higher for blacks than for whites,132 and the age-adjusted death rate for 
the black population exceeds that for the white population by 47 percent for stroke 
(cerebrovascular disease), 30 percent for heart disease, 20 percent for cancer (malig-
nant neoplasms), 106 percent for diabetes, and 800 percent for HIV.133  Research-
ers found that closing the black–white mortality gap would avoid an astonishing 
“83,000 excess deaths per year among African Americans.”134 
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the rate of 
high blood pressure for blacks is nearly double that of whites;135 blacks, Hispanics, 
and American Indians have higher rates of HIV infection than whites, while Asians 
have the lowest rates of infection;136 and diabetes is more prevalent among blacks 
and Mexican Americans than whites.137  Race-based disparities in health outcomes 
are manifest across all areas of medical care and healthcare contexts.138 
Although many factors contribute to creating and sustaining these widespread 
health disparities, including social and economic influences, studies have found that 
implicit bias, discrimination, and stereotyping by physicians play a significant role 
in producing the health differentials that cleave along racial lines.139  Evidence shows 
that race has a significant independent effect on physicians’ perceptions of patients.  
For example, a 2011 Johns Hopkins study revealed that 69 percent of medical stu-
dents surveyed exhibited implicit preferences for white people.140  Other studies 
have found that physicians tend to rate African American patients more negatively 
than whites on a number of registers, including intelligence, compliance, and pro-
pensity to engage in high-risk health behaviors.141 
  
132. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 130, at 110 tbl.23. 
133. See id. at 113 tbl.24. 
134. David Satcher et al., What if We Were Equal? A Comparison of Black–White Mortality Gap in 1960 and 
2000, 24 HEALTH AFF. 459, 459 (2005). 
135. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, HYPERTENSION AMONG ADULTS IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 2009–2010 (2012), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db 
107.htm. 
136. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, HIV SURVEILLANCE REPORT, 2010, at 7 
(2012), available at http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/surveillance/resources/reports/2010report/pdf/2010_ 
HIV_Surveillance_Report_vol_22.pdf. 
137. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 130, at 188 tbl.50. 
138. See SARA ROSENBAUM ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 115 (2d ed. 
2012); Padela & Punekar, supra note 68, at 69. 
139. See Padela et al., supra note 3, at 465; Vasquez, supra note 127, at 875–85.  See generally UNEQUAL 
TREATMENT, supra note 22. 
140. Haider et al., supra note 22, at 949. 
141. van Ryn & Burke, supra note 106, at 821.  Interestingly, these justifications were used to rationalize 
the Tuskegee syphilis study.  See SMITH, supra note 2, at 25–26. 
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Physicians may convey their negative attitudes to minority patients through 
nonverbal cues and verbal tones or inflections,142 which may deter some patients 
from seeking care or complying with medical regimens.143  These negative atti-
tudes may also shape a patient’s experience of a clinical encounter with a physician.  
Several broad-based studies have found that minority patients perceive less respect 
in race-disconcordant relationships with physicians,144 that black Americans were 
almost twice as likely as their white counterparts (16 percent versus 9 percent) to 
report being treated with disrespect by a racially disconcordant physician,145 and 
that 15 percent of black Americans surveyed believed that they would receive bet-
ter care if they were of a different race or ethnicity.146  Further, African American, 
Hispanic, and Asian patients in race-disconcordant relationships report difficul-
ties communicating with physicians at substantially higher rates than white pa-
tients in race-discordant relationships.147 
Researchers have also found that bias in interpersonal aspects of the physician–
patient relationship, whether conscious or unconscious, may influence physicians’ 
clinical decisionmaking and may negatively affect treatment recommendations, 
including the quality and type of care administered to minority patients.148  In one 
study published in the New England Journal of Medicine, a group of physicians 
were shown a series of randomly assigned videos.  Each depicted an actor portray-
ing a patient and describing symptoms suggestive of cardiovascular disease.  All 
patients were dressed identically, had identical health insurance, described their 
  
142. van Ryn & Fu, supra note 127, at 251. 
143. See Malat & Hamilton, supra note 20, at 173 (arguing that receiving care from same-race providers is 
one possible strategy for avoiding interpersonal discrimination in healthcare).  African Americans 
and other ethnic minority patients in race-disconcordant relationships with their physicians report 
less involvement in medical decisions, less partnership with physicians, lower levels of trust in phy-
sicians, and lower levels of satisfaction with care.  See Cooper et al., supra note 20, at 907; Lisa Cooper-
Patrick et al., Race, Gender, and Partnership in the Patient–Physician Relationship, 282 J. AM. MED. 
ASS’N 583 (1999); Somnath Saha et al., Patient–Physician Racial Concordance and the Perceived 
Quality and Use of Health Care, 159 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 997, 998 (1999). 
144. See KAREN SCOTT COLLINS ET AL., DIVERSE COMMUNITIES, COMMON CONCERNS: ASSESSING 
HEALTH CARE QUALITY FOR MINORITY AMERICANS: FINDINGS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH 
FUND 2001 HEALTH CARE QUALITY SURVEY, at viii (2002); Cooper et al., supra note 20, at 912; 
Jennifer Malat, Social Distance and Patients’ Rating of Healthcare Providers, 42 J. HEALTH & SOC. 
BEHAV. 360, 365–66 (2001). 
145. COLLINS ET AL., supra note 144, at 18, 21. 
146. Id. 
147. See id. at 9–10, 13; see also Cooper-Patrick et al., supra note 143, at 586 (documenting racial dispari-
ties in doctor–patient communications); Elizabeth M. Hooper et al., Patient Characteristics That 
Influence Physician Behavior, 20 MED. CARE 630, 633 (1982). 
148. See Green et al., supra note 127, at 1235; Sabin et al., supra note 127; van Ryn & Burke, supra note 
106, at 823; van Ryn & Fu, supra note 127; David R. Williams & Toni D. Rucker, Understanding 
and Addressing Racial Disparities in Health Care, 21 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 75, 79 (2000). 
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symptoms in identical terms, and presented identical diagnostic tests.  Race and 
sex were their only distinguishing characteristics.  The study found that diagnosis 
and treatment recommendations varied according to race and sex and that black 
women were least likely to be referred for diagnostic testing and treatment.149 
Further, a broad-based, national study conducted in 2003 by the Institute of 
Medicine (IOM), at the request of Congress, revealed that racial and ethnic mi-
norities receive inferior care compared with nonminorities across a spectrum of 
diseases, including cancer, cardiovascular disease, HIV/AIDS, diabetes, mental 
health, and other chronic and infectious diseases.150  These treatment disparities 
persisted even when access-related factors, such as insurance status and income, 
were controlled, and even when preferences and clinical factors were considered, 
including state of disease presentation, comorbidities, age, and severity of dis-
ease.151  Subsequent research has supported the IOM’s conclusions.152  Other stud-
ies have found that racial and ethnic minorities are less likely to undergo bypass 
surgery or to receive kidney dialysis or transplants, and are more likely to undergo 
less desirable procedures, such as lower limb amputations for diabetes.153  Further, 
physicians in hospital emergency departments prescribe fewer analgesics for black 
and Latino patients despite similar estimates of pain among groups.154  Plus, among  
 
  
149. See Schulman et al., supra note 127, at 623. 
150. UNEQUAL TREATMENT, supra note 22, at 38–71.  The IOM defined disparities as “racial or ethnic 
differences in the quality of healthcare that are not due to access-related factors or clinical needs, 
preferences, and appropriateness of intervention.”  Id. at 32 (footnote omitted). 
151. Id. at 32. 
152. See, e.g., Jerry Cromwell et al., Race/Ethnic Disparities in Utilization of Lifesaving Technologies by 
Medicare Ischemic Heart Disease Beneficiaries, 43 MED. CARE 330, 334 (2005); Peter W. Groeneveld 
et al., Technology Diffusions, Hospital Variation, and Racial Disparities Among Elderly Medicare 
Beneficiaries 1989–2000, 43 MED. CARE 320, 323–26 (2005); James M. Guwani & Robert Weech-
Maldonado, Medicaid Management Care and Racial Disparities in AIDS Treatment, 26 HEALTH 
CARE FINANCING REV. 119, 128 (2004). 
153. See generally Darrell J. Gaskin & Catherine Hoffman, Racial and Ethnic Differences in Preventable 
Hospitalizations Across 10 States, 57 MED. CARE RES. & REV., supp. 1, 2000, at 85; Robert M. 
Mayberry et al., Racial and Ethnic Differences in Access to Medical Care, 57 MED. CARE RES. & REV., 
supp. 1, 2000 at 108, 129–30; Schulman et al., supra note 127; Knox H. Todd et al., Ethnicity and 
Analgesic Practice, 35 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 11 (2000) [hereinafter Todd et al., Ethnicity 
and Analgesic Practice]; Knox H. Todd et al., Ethnicity as Risk Factor for Inadequate Emergency 
Department Analgesia, 269 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1537 (1993) [hereinafter Todd et al., Ethnicity as 
Risk Factor]. 
154. See Vence L. Bonham, Race, Ethnicity, and Pain Treatment: Striving to Understand the Causes and 
Solutions to the Disparities in Pain Treatment, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 52, 52 (2001) (citing “[n]umer-
ous studies [that] have revealed that racial and ethnic minority groups often receive different and less 
optimal management of their health care than white Americans” and finding such disparities to be 
“the legacy of a racially divided health system”); Joshua H. Tamayo-Sarver et al., Racial and Ethnic 
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trauma patients, race is independently associated with higher mortality.155 
The data thus shows that medical practice remains rife with racial bias and 
that minority patients often receive substandard healthcare because of physician 
prejudice.  Meanwhile, respecting patients’ requests for physician–patient race 
concordance offers significant benefits, particularly for racial minority patients, in-
cluding greater patient satisfaction, increased access to preventative care, more ef-
fective physician–patient communication, and more participatory decisionmaking, 
which are all necessary aspects of effective medical treatment.156  Therefore, accom-
modating patients’ racial preferences may constitute an effective means of coun-
teracting the effects of physician bias while satisfying Title VI’s aim of ensuring 
that all patients are able to participate in and benefit from federally funded hos-
pitals. 
Title VI adopts the strict scrutiny standard of review, according to which the 
covered entity must prove that its action serves a compelling governmental interest 
and is essential to achieving that interest (that is, the least restrictive means of real-
izing that interest).157  Although this is a high bar, improving patient care, coun-
tering racial bias, reducing race-based health disparities, and saving lives should 
qualify as a compelling interest that justifies bowing to patients’ racial preferences.  
Moreover, the practice of accommodating patients’ choices furthers compelling 
interests in improving healthcare and is narrowly tailored to achieve this interest to 
the extent that it applies only to those patients who are resolute in their decisions 
to forego necessary care if their preferences are not accommodated.  
IV. HOW TO THINK ABOUT THE ACCOMMODATION  
OF PATIENTS’ RACIAL PREFERENCES 
Accommodating patients’ racial preferences with respect to their choice of phy-
sician is an important and enduring practice in the hospital context.  Part II demon-
strated that EMTALA, along with deeply rooted norms of informed consent and 
battery, makes clear that there are valid reasons to accommodate.  I have also 
shown that existing antidiscrimination law does not prohibit the practice.  As I de-
scribe in this Part, however, there are also troubling aspects of indulging patients’ 
  
Disparities in Emergency Department Analgesic Prescription, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2067 (2003); 
Todd et al., Ethnicity as Risk Factor, supra note 153; Todd et al., Ethnicity and Analgesic Practice, supra 
note 153. 
155. See Adil H. Haider et al., Race and Insurance Status as Risk Factors for Trauma Mortality, 143 
ARCHIVES SURGERY 945 (2008). 
156. See infra Part IV.A. 
157. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305 (1978). 
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racial biases.  Thus, we are faced with the fundamental dilemma of how to reconcile 
these troubling aspects with respect for patient autonomy and the empirical reality 
that accommodating patients’ racial preferences appears to foster positive health 
outcomes. 
This Part engages this dilemma.  Building on the empirical evidence intro-
duced in Part III, this Part makes an affirmative case for accommodating patients’ 
racial preferences with respect to their choice of physician but acknowledges that 
there are also disadvantages to indulging such requests.  This Part addresses the 
disturbing facets of this practice and concludes by proposing policy solutions de-
signed to alleviate the need for accommodation. 
A. The Case for Accommodation and Its Limitations 
The case for accommodation can be understood to rest on several core empir-
ical insights, including research showing that patients whose racial preferences are 
respected regarding their choice of physician show higher levels of satisfaction in 
their clinical encounters and that for some patients having a physician of the same 
racial background confers substantial health benefits.158  Indeed, several recent 
studies on the health benefits of physician–patient race concordance show that 
such concordance is associated with higher levels of patient-centered communica-
tion.159  And even after adjusting for patient age, gender, education, marital status, 
health status, and the length of the physician–patient relationship, researchers have 
found that race-concordant physician–patient relationships tend to promote more 
participatory decisionmaking.160 
One study found that race-concordant healthcare visits are longer than dis-
concordant visits, and this held true even when researchers accounted for criteria 
associated with longer patient visits, such as older age, higher socioeconomic sta-
tus, and inferior health status.161  The duration of a patient’s visit with a provider is 
considered an important indicator of the quality of care,162 and patients report that 
during these longer visits they experience greater ease discussing problems and 
  
158. See Cooper et al., supra note 20, at 913 tbl.3; LaVeist et al., supra note 106, at 146; van Ryn & Burke, 
supra note 106, at 823.  But see Meghani et al., supra note 22 (arguing that the results of race-concordance 
studies are inconclusive). 
159. See Cooper et al., supra note 20, at 911. 
160. Cooper-Patrick et al., supra note 143, at 586–87; see Cooper et al., supra note 20, at 910. 
161. See Cooper et al., supra note 20, at 911. 
162. See John H. Wiggers & Rob Sanson-Fisher, Duration of General Practice Consultations: Association 
With Patient Occupational and Educational Status, 44 SOC. SCI. MED. 925, 926 (1997). 
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making decisions.163  Notably, black patients in a racially concordant relationship 
with their physicians are more likely to view their healthcare visits as highly partic-
ipatory, to be more satisfied with their treatment, and to receive preventive care and 
necessary medical interventions.164 
In a different study, nearly one-quarter of African Americans and one-third 
of Latinos reported a preference for same-race healthcare providers,165 and most 
chose racially concordant physicians because of personal preferences not solely 
because of reasons of geographic accessibility.166  Studies suggest that for these 
patients physician–patient race concordance not only affects the quality of the in-
teractions but can also improve health outcomes.167 
In addition to these research findings, EMTALA, medical ethics principles, 
and the doctrines of informed consent and battery are consistent with the accom-
modation of patients’ racial preferences even if they do not require it.  Furthermore, 
as I have argued, the patchwork of civil rights laws that address race discrimination 
cannot be read to bar this practice.168 
Under these circumstances, in order to advance antidiscrimination norms 
meaningfully—in substance rather than just in form—I argue that we should con-
ceptualize the issue of accommodating patients’ racial preferences not in terms of 
the rigid application of formal antidiscrimination principles but rather through an 
antisubordination lens.  By this I mean that we should address the negative impact 
that centuries of race discrimination have had on members of disadvantaged groups 
by allowing for the consideration of race in some circumstances rather than adopt 
a formalist approach that would view any consideration of race as problematic.169  
  
163. See J.G.R. Howie et al., Long to Short Consultation Ratio: A Proxy Measure of Quality of Care for General 
Practice, 41 BRIT. J. GEN. PRAC. 48, 48 (1991); D.C. Morrell et al., The “Five Minute” Consultation: 
Effect of Time Constraint on Clinical Content and Patient Satisfaction, 292 BRIT. MED. J. 870, 872 
(1986). 
164. See Jersey Chen et al., Racial Differences in the Use of Cardiac Catheterization After Acute Myocardial 
Infarction, 344 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1443, 1447–48 (2001); Saha et al., supra note 143, at 998. 
165. See Padela & Punekar, supra note 68, at 69. 
166. See Saha et al., supra note 21, at 76–83. 
167. See supra Part III.C. 
168. See supra Part II. 
169. Several constitutional law scholars conceptualize the role of race in government decisionmaking as 
cleaving according to the anticlassification and antisubordination interests.  See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin 
& Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 9, 9 (2003) (attributing the antisubordination idea to Owen Fiss and explaining that 
“[a]ntisubordination theorists contend that guarantees of equal citizenship cannot be realized under 
conditions of pervasive social stratification and argue that law should reform institutions and prac-
tices that enforce the secondary social status of historically oppressed groups”); Charles R. Lawrence 
III, Forbidden Conversations: On Race, Privacy, and Community (A Continuing Conversation With John 
Ely on Racism and Democracy), 114 YALE L.J. 1353, 1382 (2004) (asserting that the Equal Protection 
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As noted in Part II, EMTALA and the modern doctrines of battery and informed 
consent emerged in part to protect poor and racial-minority patients from patient 
dumping, nonconsensual treatment, and battery in medical practice and clinical 
research.  Prohibiting the accommodation of patients’ racial preferences in light of 
recent evidence of pervasive physician bias may, ironically, jeopardize the health 
of racial minority patients by rendering them vulnerable to the kinds of abuses 
against which these laws and legal doctrines were established to guard. 
B. The Limits of Accommodation 
Although the accommodation of patients’ racial preferences appears to con-
fer significant benefits to patients of all races,170 we may still be troubled by the dif-
ficulty of distinguishing between legitimate expressions of racial preference for 
physician race concordance and those based in racism or bigotry.  Undoubtedly, 
there are many reasons why patients may request or decline treatment by physicians 
of a particular racial or ethnic background.  These reasons include positive prior ex-
periences in racially concordant relationships, negative past experiences with phy-
sician bias in racially disconcordant relationship, and racism—namely, bigotry or 
prejudices about members of certain racial and ethnic groups other than one’s own. 
Patients who have had positive experiences with people of the same racial or 
cultural background may be more trusting of and feel more comfortable with phy-
sicians who share their racial or cultural characteristics.171  This sense of sharing a 
common culture or social experience may also lead patients to believe (rightly or 
wrongly) that a physician of a similar racial group is more likely to promote and 
protect their interests and to exercise more sensitive care with regard to treatment.172 
Negative experiences may also drive a patient toward rejecting or requesting 
a physician of a particular racial background, as preferences may be shaped by lin-
gering distrust resulting from one’s own or others’ prior experiences of racial bias, 
  
Clause “creates a new substantive value of ‘nonslavery’ and antisubordination to replace the old values 
of slavery and white supremacy”); Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification 
Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1472–73 (2003) (describ-
ing the antisubordination principle as “the conviction that it is wrong for the state to engage in prac-
tices that enforce the inferior social status of historically oppressed groups”). 
170. See generally Cooper et al., supra note 20, at 907; Cooper-Patrick et al., supra note 143; LaVeist & 
Nuru-Jeter, supra note 22. 
171. See generally David H. Thom, Physician Behaviors That Predict Patient Trust, 50 J. FAM. PRAC. 323 
(2001). 
172. See LaVeist & Nuru-Jeter, supra note 22, at 303; Malat & Hamilton, supra note 20, at 174. 
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discrimination, or discourteous or substandard care.173  While segregation and bla-
tant racial discrimination are no longer the norm in medicine, numerous studies 
report that more subtle forms of discrimination endure.174  Although most patients 
are sensitive to the interpersonal dynamic that occurs in medical encounters, black 
patients may be acutely aware of interpersonal cues from physicians because of his-
torical and personal experiences with discrimination in healthcare and in society at 
large.175  Research on racial stigma suggests that individuals cope with the threat of 
bias or discrimination by avoiding interactions with the stigmatizing group.176  Thus, 
to avoid negative encounters, racial minorities (who are more likely to experience 
discrimination while seeking health services) may prefer physician–patient racial 
concordance or reject physicians who are members of a perceived stigmatizing 
group.177 
Finally, a patient’s request for or refusal of treatment by a physician of a par-
ticular race may also be a manifestation of racism.178  For example, during the period 
of legally sanctioned segregation, many white professionals and the lay public open-
ly expressed the belief that the medical care provided by black physicians was nec-
essarily of poor quality.179 
The source of patients’ racial preferences with respect to their choice of phy-
sicians should play a part in determining appropriate policy solutions.  Standard 
  
173. See Vanessa Northington Gamble, Under the Shadow of Tuskegee: African Americans and Health Care, 
87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1773, 1776 (1997) (arguing that black Americans’ distrust of the medical 
profession is rooted in a long history of exploitation and disrespect, epitomized by the Tuskegee 
study, whose legacy “endures, in part, because the racism and disrespect for [b]lack lives that it en-
tailed mirror [b]lack people’s contemporary experiences with the medical profession”). 
174. See Calman, supra note 127, at 172–74 (explaining how racial prejudices affect and limit patients’ 
health care opportunities); Perez, supra note 127, at 628, 633, 636–37; Schulman et al., supra note 
127, at 618, 623–24 (discussing how race and sex influence physician recommendations in the treat-
ment of cardiovascular disease); Todd et al., Ethnicity and Analgesic Practice, supra note 153; Todd et 
al., Ethnicity as Risk Factor, supra note 153; van Ryn & Burke, supra note 106 (finding that doctors’ 
opinions regarding their African American patients tend to be more negative than those regarding 
their white patients); Williams, supra note 127, at 177–80; Williams & Collins, supra note 127, at 
405–07. 
175. See Cooper et al., supra note 20, at 913; LaVeist et al., supra note 106, at 151; van Ryn & Burke, 
supra note 106. 
176. See Alvin N. Alvarez & Linda P. Juang, Filipino Americans and Racism: A Multiple Mediation Model 
of Coping, 57 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 167 (2010); Elizabeth Brondolo et al., Coping With Racism: 
A Selective Review of the Literature and a Theoretical and Methodological Critique, 32 J. BEHAV. MED. 
64 (2009); Vetta L. Sanders Thompson, Coping Responses and the Experience of Discrimination, 36 J. 
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1198 (2006). 
177. See COLLINS ET AL., supra note 144, at 18, 21. 
178. LaVeist & Nuru-Jeter, supra note 22, at 303 (“[R]ace concordant patient preference may be a mani-
festation of the internalization of broader societal racism.”). 
179. See BYRD & CLAYTON, supra note 1, at 65. 
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medical practice requires those who express these preferences to undergo an ethics 
consultation to determine not only the strength of their conviction but also to im-
press on the patient the advantages of working with the assigned physician.180  Yet 
in a life-threatening situation or when the patient has no alternate venue for med-
ical care, is firm in her decision, and cannot be deterred; EMTALA, battery, and 
medical ethics rules counsel that the patient’s preferences be respected. 
Still, the notion of white patients rejecting minority physicians for bigoted 
reasons in emergency departments and other hospital settings is deeply troubling 
and uncomfortably reminiscent of the type of discrimination that the civil rights 
statutes were designed to eliminate.  This concern complicates emergency depart-
ment physicians’ duty to provide necessary treatment and their efforts to uphold 
their promise under the Hippocratic Oath to do no harm.  It also underscores a fun-
damental tension between their roles as healers and as conservators of widely shared 
moral precepts.181 
The reality, however, is that this problem may seldom arise, as a recent study 
found that requests for treatment by a physician of a particular race are most often 
accommodated when made by racial minority patients.182  This practice may be 
  
180. See Padela & Punekar, supra note 68, at 71. 
181. Under the AMA Code of Ethics, physicians have “ethical obligations to place patients’ welfare above 
their own self-interest and above obligations to other groups, and to advocate for their patients’ wel-
fare.”  Opinion 10.015, supra note 109. 
182. See Padela et al., supra note 3, at 468.  Moreover, white physicians account for approximately 78.4 
percent of emergency physicians in the United States.  ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLS., DIVERSITY IN 
THE PHYSICIAN WORKFORCE: FACTS AND FIGURES 2010, at 75 tbl.9 (2010), available at https:// 
members.aamc.org/eweb/upload/Diversity in the Physician Workforce Facts and Figures 2010.pdf.   
Therefore, white patients who seek a physician of the same race tend to have little difficulty 
locating one.  See Benton, supra note 3, at 23; Total Physicians by Race/Ethnicity—2008, AM. MED. 
ASSOC., http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/about-ama/our-people/member-groups-sections/min 
ority-affairs-section/physician-statistics/total-physicians-raceethnicity.page (last visited Nov. 17, 
2012).  This is not the case for racial and ethnic minority populations, which are twice as likely as 
whites to rely on physicians in emergency departments, hospital clinics, or outpatient departments 
for their regular care rather than on a private physician or other office-based provider.  See Padela & 
Punekar, supra note 68, at 69 (finding that the emergency department is often the primary venue for 
underserved ethnic and racial minorities to access healthcare); see also ROSENBAUM ET AL., supra 
note 138, at 115; Marsha Lillie-Blanton & Caya B. Lewis, Policy Challenges and Opportunities in 
Closing the Racial/Ethnic Divide in Health Care 3 (Kaiser Family Found. Issue Brief, 2005) (“28% of 
Latinos and 22% of African Americans report having little or no choice in where to seek care, while 
only 15% of whites report this difficulty.”).  Research shows that people of color have less access to 
healthcare when compared to whites, as the level of uninsurance is 34 percent among Hispanics and 
21 percent among blacks versus 13 percent among whites.  Nicole Lurie & Tamara Dubowitz, Health 
Disparities and Access to Health, 297 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1118, 119 (2007).  Moreover, minority 
women are more likely to avoid a visit to a physician for financial reasons.  CARA V. JAMES ET AL., 
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PUTTING WOMEN’S HEALTH CARE DISPARITIES ON THE MAP: 
EXAMINING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES AT THE STATE LEVEL 56 (2009).  Further, 
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justified to the extent that racial and ethnic minority patients are statistically more 
likely than white patients to experience discriminatory treatment in a racially dis-
concordant physician–patient encounter.183  Moreover, the chance of experiencing 
such discriminatory treatment is heightened in the hospital environment, which is 
“ripe for misunderstandings, stereotyping, and poor collaboration,” as physicians 
who work in hospital emergency departments are often fatigued and must operate 
under significant time constraints.184  Research indicates that individuals often rely 
on unconscious biases and stereotyping in such circumstances as these cognitive 
processes allow individuals to evaluate complex information quickly through the 
use of social categories.185  The negative consequences of this behavior are likely to 
have a disproportionate effect on blacks and Latinos.  
None of this is to suggest that we should not remain concerned about racist 
motives among patients.  Nevertheless, substantial empirical data attests to the med-
ical significance and benefits of accommodating patients’ racial preferences, and to 
the extent that evidence shows unequivocally that it improves health outcomes and 
may contribute to the reduction of race-based health disparities, then we should 
respect patients’ racial preferences in the hospital context. 
C. Beyond Accommodation 
As this Article demonstrates, there are immense benefits to accommodating 
patients’ racial preferences in the hospital setting, including improving the quality 
  
“Native Americans and Native Alaskans more often lack prenatal care in the first trimester.”  AM. 
COLL. OF PHYSICIANS, supra note 128, at 3.  And although demand for emergency services rose to 
136 million total visits in 2009, African Americans visited at a greater rate than whites.  See Brown, supra 
note 34. 
183. See COLLINS ET AL., supra note 144, at 18, 21. 
184. Padela & Punekar, supra note 68, at 71; see UNEQUAL TREATMENT, supra note 22, at 199–214; 
Fred G.W.C. Paas & Jeroen J.G. Van Merriënboer, Instructional Control of Cognitive Load in the 
Training of Complex Cognitive Tasks, 6 EDUC. PSYCHOL. REV. 351 (1994). 
185. See Haider et al., supra note 22, at 949; see also John A. Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social Behavior: 
Direct Effects of Trait Construct and Stereotype Activation on Action, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 230, 239 (1996) (explaining that individuals placed in a frustrating situation responded 
with more hostility when subliminally primed using an African American male face than a white 
male face); Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 
8 (1976) (addressing the ways in which people tend to favor in-group members and their interests 
more than out-group members); Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, but Now I See”: White Race Consciousness 
and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 959 (1992) (“The imposition 
of transparently white norms is a unique form of unconscious discrimination . . . .”); Charles R. 
Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. 
REV. 317, 322 (1987) (arguing that in American culture and society racism permeates virtually eve-
ryone’s unconscious). 
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of care provided to minority populations and addressing racial and ethnic health 
differentials.  Nevertheless, this Article has shown that this practice is not without 
its limitations, as it offers neither a complete nor a fully satisfying solution to the 
problems of race-based health disparities and physician bias.  To devise appropriate, 
long-term means of addressing these concerns, the medical profession must go be-
yond accommodating patients’ racial preferences to expanding cultural awareness 
at all levels of practice and training to enable providers to interact more effectively 
with various patient populations.  The profession must also increase diversity among 
providers as a means of encouraging tolerance and understanding of other cultures.186 
In order to train physicians to better comprehend and address the specific needs 
of a diverse patient population, in recent years, the medical profession and medical 
schools have focused on providing culturally competent care, which, according to 
the IOM, requires the provision of care “that is respectful of and responsive to indi-
vidual patient preferences, needs, and values.”187  The idea behind culturally com-
petent care is the promotion of greater “physician understanding of social, cultural, 
and economic factors that influence their patients,” and the fostering of an effec-
tive patient–physician relationship.188  Thus, the American College of Physicians, 
the largest medical specialty society in the United States, recommends that “[p]hy-
sicians and other health care professionals must be sensitive to cultural diversity 
among patients and recognize that preconceived perceptions of minority patients 
may play a role in their treatment and contribute to disparities in health care among 
racial and ethnic minorities.”189 
Cultural-competency training is necessary at all levels of medical education 
and professional practice, as a 2011 Johns Hopkins study found that medical stu-
dents may actually learn to treat nonwhite patients differently from white patients.190  
While survey data shows that virtually all medical residents recognize the impor-
tance of addressing cultural-competency issues, nearly one in five believes that they 
were ill prepared to care for individuals who did not share their Anglo-American 
  
186. See Padela & Punekar, supra note 68, at 69; see also Chen et al., supra note 21. 
187. COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY 
CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 6 (2001). 
188. Jeremy Spevick, The Case for Racial Concordance Between Patients and Physicians, AM. MED. ASS’N 
J. ETHICS VIRTUAL MENTOR, June 2003, http://virtualmentor.ama-assn.org/2003/06/jdsc2-
0306.html (citing Amici Curiae Brief of the Association of American Medical Colleges et al. 
in Support of the State of Texas, Seeking Rehearing En Banc and Reversal at 9, Hopwood v. 
Texas, 236 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000) (No. 98-50506)). 
189. AM. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS, supra note 128, at 1; see also UNEQUAL TREATMENT, supra note 22, 
at 199–214 (describing the body of literature in support of cross-cultural education in the training of 
physicians). 
190. See Haider et al., supra note 22, at 949. 
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cultural beliefs regarding the practice of medicine.191  Many medical residents also 
report that they lack professional mentorship in the area of cross-cultural care and 
are seldom evaluated on their cultural-competency skills.192 
Therefore, although cultural-competency training is critical to fostering trust 
and communication—two elements necessary to an effective physician–patient 
relationship—and to improving health outcomes and reducing health disparities, 
studies make clear that more needs to be done to bridge the gap.193  Medical schools 
must also create an environment where students can interact with a racially and 
ethnically diverse cohort, faculty, and community of mentors because this, as much 
as textbooks and clinical learning, is a necessary and integral part of a quality medi-
cal education and an important means of promoting understanding between future 
physicians and their prospective patients.  Yet, despite the fact that research reveals 
that students in a diverse student body demonstrate better cultural competency and 
cross-cultural training than those trained in a more racially and ethnically homo-
geneous academic environment, of more than 16,000 medical school graduates in 
2008, only 2447 were African American, Hispanic, or Native American.194 
Among the many benefits of a multicultural medical school environment is its 
potential to increase the racial and ethnic diversity within the ranks of the profes-
sion.195  Members of racial and ethnic minority populations are severely underrep-
resented in the medical profession.  Although African Americans, Hispanics, and 
Native Americans constitute over 25 percent of the nation’s population, in 2007 
African Americans accounted for only 3.5 percent, Hispanics 5 percent, and Native 
Americans and Native Alaskans 0.2 percent of physicians.196 
A multicultural physician workforce that reflects the country’s racial and eth-
nic diversity and that is more representative of the patients it serves may not only 
improve patient satisfaction, strengthen cultural competence, and promote sensi-
tivity and tolerance among health professionals; it may also facilitate quality care 
and reduce physician biases along with the need for the accommodation of pa-
tients’ racial preferences. 
  
191. AM. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS, supra note 128, at 10–11. 
192. Id. at 11. 
193. Spevick, supra note 188; see also UNEQUAL TREATMENT, supra note 22, at 1. 
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195. Id. at 14. 
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CONCLUSION 
Despite this country’s long and sordid history of race discrimination in 
healthcare, race remains of significant salience in medicine, and there are ways 
in which it is still being used that are neither widely discussed nor fully regulated.  
Although the common, if little debated, practice of physicians acceding to pa-
tients’ racial preferences in the hospital setting might, at first glance, appear to 
perpetuate this history of inequality and violate antidiscrimination laws, as this 
Article makes clear, there are several important reasons why physicians quietly, 
but routinely, engage in this practice and why antidiscrimination laws have not 
been and should not be interpreted to reach this conduct. 
Numerous studies show that physician–patient race concordance confers 
tremendous health benefits to patients, particularly those from racial minority pop-
ulations, and advances antisubordination norms.  Therefore, until we improve di-
versity within medical education and the profession, and unless we effectively 
educate and train a more culturally competent corps of physicians, we must preserve 
the practice of accommodating patients’ racial preferences in the hospital setting.  
Indeed, although the kind of discrimination that Juliette Derricotte and John 
McBride faced is no longer permitted, it may be, ironically, that accommodating 
patients’ own racial preferences within hospitals not only comports with our 
normative commitments to racial equality but also constitutes one of the most ef-
fective means currently available to advance racial justice in healthcare, and, quite 
possibly, to save patients’ lives. 
 
 
